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DOMESTIC RELATIONS JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE GREAT, SLUMBERING BAEHR:

ON DEFINITIONAL PRECLUSION,
EQUAL PROTECTION, AND
FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS
Mark Strasser*
INTRODUCTION

S AME-sex marriage poses a particularly thorny problem for domes-

tic relations jurisprudence. Courts upholding state refusals to recognize such marriages must ignore or reinterpret a whole host of
related precedents if they are going to justify their positions. For example, in Loving v. Virginia,1 the Court struck down prohibitions on
interracial marriage, despite a longstanding belief that such marriages
were immoral and contrary to natural law.2 When the Court in Turner
v. Safley 3 articulated the various interests served by marriage, the
Court did not imply that marriage was only instrumentally important
to facilitate the having and raising of children 4 -on the contrary, it
made clear that the right to marry is itself fundamental s In Zablocki
v. Redhail,6 the Court recognized that "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals" 7-the Court did not suggest
that the right was only important for straight people.
In Baehr v. Lewin, Hawaii's refusal to allow same-sex individuals
to marry was challenged. A plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that the marriage law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
state constitution because it facially discriminated on the basis of
sex-it allowed men to marry women but not men and allowed women to marry men but not women. The court rejected the argument
that substantive due process issues were also implicated, reasoning
* Assistant Professor, Capital University Law School B.A., Harvard University, Ph.D., University of Chicago, J.D., Stanford Law School. I would like to thank
George Cronheim for his helpful discussion of these and related issues and the Capital University Law School for providing a Faculty Summer Research Grant.
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id at 3 (discussing trial court's view that God did not intend such marriages);
see also Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va.) (discussing with approval a holding
that "the natural law which forbids their [racial] intermarriage and the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races is as clearly divine as that which imparted
to them different natures"), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
3. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

4. See id at 95-96.

5. Id at 95.

6. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
7. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
8. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsiderationgranted in part,875 P2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
9. Id. at 59-60 (plurality opinion).
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that there is no fundamental right of persons of the same sex to
marry' ° because same-sex marriage was neither "so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of Hawaii's people that failure to
recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice"" nor "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed."' 2 The
court failed to appreciate that analogous reasoning might have been
used by the Loving Court to establish that there is no fundamental
right of persons of different races to marry.
Courts refusing to recognize that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry have offered either cramped interpretations or,
in some cases, radical recreations of the relevant case law. Unless
these decisions are overruled, they may result in the trampling of
rights, previously considered fundamental, of both gay and straight
people. Courts must stop pretending that they can avoid substantive
positions by citing spurious definitional bars, must stop reinventing
case law to substantially limit what qualifies as a fundamental interest,
and must stop exaggerating particular state interests while turning a
blind eye to others in order to justify what cannot in good faith be
justified.
Part I of this Article discusses the claim that same-sex marriage is
precluded by definition. The argument is fallacious insofar as it implies that the legislature is not itself responsible for the legal definition
of marriage or insofar as it implies that definitions (as opposed to
other types of classifications) can escape judicial scrutiny. Part II discusses the equal protection issues implicated by a refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage. Such a policy is invidious because it involves discrimination on the basis of gender as well as on the basis of sexual
orientation, and because it imposes unfair burdens on children. Part
III discusses the due process issues implicated by state refusals to recognize same-sex unions. The reasons that the right to marry is fundamental apply with equal force to all people, regardless of sexual
orientation. The refusal of states to recognize same-sex marriages
cannot pass constitutional muster and must be changed.
I. DEFINITIONS
Courts have used definitions in a variety of ways to preclude lesbian, bisexual, and gay people from marrying or from having families.
Sometimes, definitions are used to absolve legislatures from resp onsibility for their unwillingness to countenance same-sex unions.' 3 At
other times, legislative definitions are arbitrarily modified so that
10. Id. at 56-57 (plurality opinion).

11. Id. at 57 (plurality opinion).
12. Id. (plurality opinion).
13. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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same-sex couples will not be considered family and will not receive
the benefits that other similarly situated couples may receive. 14 Not
only do these verbal manipulations deprive lesbian, gay, and bisexual
individuals of the immediate rights at issue, but they may also create
precedents that can be used to deprive all individuals of their rights,
regardless of their sexual orientation. Further, these decisions undermine the public's confidence that courts will examine issues fairly and
in good faith. Courts must stop offering casuistic reasoning to avoid
substantive issues.
A. Marriage
A variety of courts have suggested that same-sex marriages are precluded by definition and thus there is no need to consider any of the
possible substantive issues raised by a state's refusal to recognize such
marriages. In Singer v. Hara,'5 the court held that two men unable to
secure a marriage license had not been denied a fundamental right;
instead, they had been "denied entry into the marriage relationship
because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which
may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the
opposite sex."' 6 In Jones v. Hallahan,'7 the court rejected the argument that either the state or the county clerk had discriminated
against two women by refusing to issue them a marriage license;
rather, the court held, these individuals were by definition incapable
of marrying each other: "[A]ppellants are prevented from marrying,
not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court
Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their
own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined." 18
When the Hallahan court asserted that the appellants could not
marry because they were unable to meet the definitional requirements, the court implied that the legislature was not itself responsible
14. See Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying death
benefits for partner and her children even though she and deceased had gone through
a formal ceremony); Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410,
411-12 (Ct. App. 1985) (denying partner dental benefits); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121,123 (Vis. Ct. App. 1992) (denying partner insurance
benefits).
15. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
16. Id. at 1192 (footnote omitted).
17. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
18. Id. at 589; see also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 361 (D.C. 1995)
(Terry, J., concurring) ("[T]he word 'marriage,' when used to denote a legal status,
refers only to the mutual relationship between a man and a woman as husband and
wife, ... same-sex 'marriages' are legally and factually-ie., definitionally-impossible."); In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (Sur. Ct. 1990) ("[T]he terms
'marriage' and 'spouse' necessarily and exclusively involve a contract between persons of different sexes."), afftd, 592 N.Y.S2d 797 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 624
N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1993); G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 541, 560 (1985) ("Definitionally, two persons of the same

sex are not fit for the function of participating in opposite-sex marriage.").
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for the legal definition of marriage, as if the legislature were subject to
the commands of some Higher Power. If the legislature could not recognize same-sex marriages because the "God of nature made it otherwise"' 19 and the legislature was bound by God's rule, then one could
understand how the legislature would have to be held blameless and
the statutory classification would have to be upheld. Yet, the argument that God's Law prohibits certain marital unions has not been
successful in the past. For example, it has long been argued that God
rejects the proposition that the races should be allowed to intermarry.20 Insofar as legislatures must "impose such restraints upon the
[marriage] relation as the laws of God, and the laws of propriety, morality and social order demand,"'" and insofar as God and morality
demand that interracial marriages not be recognized, legislatures
would seem bound not to recognize them. Yet, states must recognize
interracial marriages, demands of "morality" notwithstanding.
The argument that individuals wishing to marry someone of their
own sex are definitionally precluded from doing so is mistaken for at
least two reasons. First, the argument is fallacious insofar as it allegedly describes current speaking practices. In everyday speech, people
use the term "marriage" to refer to long-term, same-sex relationships.' Not only do journalists, theorists, and everyday speakers talk
about same-sex marriages, but some religions recognize them.23 Indeed, the state of Hawaii implicitly, if not explicitly, recognized that
religious groups sanctify same-sex marriages when it refused to impose sanctions on religious organizations that solemnified such unions.24 Thus, if usage of the term was the relevant consideration,
courts could not dispose of the relevant issues by appealing to the
19. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321,326 (1869); see also Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749,752
(Va.) (discussing with approval a case holding that "the natural law which forbids
their intermarriage and the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races
is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them different natures"), vacated on
proceduralgrounds, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).

20. See Dean, 653 A.2d at 359 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing "the premise of the trial court opinion the Supreme Court rejected in
Loving: that a divine natural order forbids racial intermarriage" (footnote omitted)).
21. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 862 (1878).
22. Dean, 653 A.2d at 315 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[Tihe terms 'marriage' and 'gay marriage' are used colloquially today to refer to
long-term same-sex relationships between gays and between lesbians.").
23. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimis-

cegenation Analogy, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 981, 987 (1991) (noting that journalists,
speakers, theorists, and some religions include same-sex relationships within the notion of marriage); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and
the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 93, 96 (1993) ("Some churches perform
ceremonies uniting same-sex couples.").

24. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1.6 (Supp. 1994) ("Nothing is this chapter shall be
construed to render unlawful, or otherwise affirmatively punishable at law, the solemnization of same-sex relationships by religious organizations . .. ").
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definition of the term "marriage."' Second, even if the description
were accurate, the argument would still have very little, if any, legal
weight.-6 Dictionary entries do not justify the abridgement of fundamental rights.
Perhaps courts are not appealing to everyday speech, but are instead appealing to the definitions of marriage that the state legislatures have adopted.27 Certainly, courts may legitimately look at
statutory definitions for certain purposes, such as to discern legislative
intent. If discerning legislative intent is the court's purpose, however,
the court would not be looking at the definition to absolve the legislature from responsibility but, instead, merely to help interpret the legislature's enactment.
Courts will have no difficulty in interpreting the intent of those state
legislatures that have explicitly 2pecifed that individuals of the same
sex may not marry each other, but courts should consider at least
two implications of these enactments. First, these legislatures are not
bound by these definitions of who may marry whom-the legislatures
could repeal the prohibition of same-sex marriage should they so desire (although, of course, they are extremely unlikely to do so). Second, those legislatures that explicitly reject same-sex marriage are
themselves implicitly indicating that they do not believe that same-sex
marriages are definitionally precluded-if such unions were definitionally precluded, pronouncements declaring them void would be unnecessary. By indicating that they understand that such marriages are
possible, the legislatures imply that they are refusing to recognize such
unions for reasons of public policy rather than for reasons of definitional preclusion.29
Some states have not explicitly rejected same-sex marriages but instead have said that only marriages between a man and a woman will
be considered valid.30 These state legislatures have also made their
25. For a related discussion concerning whether courts must recognize that marriage includes same-sex unions, see infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
26. For an extended discussion of these issues, see generally Strasser, supra note
23 (criticizing definitional preclusion arguments).
27. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. CL App. 1974) ("Washington

statutes ... are clearly founded upon the presumption that marriage, as a legal relationship, may exist only between one man and one woman .... ." (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
28. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 89 (West 1952 & Supp. I 1992) ("Persons of the
same sex may not contract marriage with each other."); Tex. Farn. Code Ann. § 1.01
(West 1993) ("A license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same
sex."); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(5) (1995) ("[Marriages are prohibited and declared
void ... between persons of the same sex."); Va. Code Ann. § 20-452 (Michie 1995)
("A marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited.").
29. See infra notes 428-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the
public policy considerations implicated by such legislative action.
30. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (Supp. 1994) ("IT'he marriage contract.., shall be
only between a man and a woman...."); Ind. Code § 31-7-1-2 (1987) ("Only a female
may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female."); Md. Code Ann., Fain. Law

926
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intentions sufficiently clear: if only a marriage between a man and a
woman is valid, then a marriage between a man and a man or between
a woman and a woman is not valid. Implicitly, if not explicitly, these
legislatures also considered whether to recognize same-sex marriages.
While they have also decided that they do not wish to recognize such
marriages, it is clear that the reason that such unions are definitionally
precluded is that the legislatures themselves have created the exclusionary definitions.
Perhaps it will be thought that legislatures have explicitly precluded
same-sex marriages statutorily because courts have had some difficulty in the past interpreting marriage statutes that lacked an explicit
exclusion. On the contrary, courts have had no difficulty inferring legislative desires even when states have not included language that
either explicitly precluded same-sex individuals from marrying or that
explicitly limited marriage to opposite-sex individuals. In Baker v.
Nelson,3 1 a Minnesota court interpreted the Minnesota statute to exclude same-sex marriages even though no language suggested that
only a marriage contract between a man and a woman would be considered valid."
Two different issues should not be conflated. One issue is whether
legislatures intend to allow same-sex marriages. Another issue is
whether legislatures could include same-sex relationships within the
definition of marriage. While it is plausible to believe that legislatures
have not intended to allow same-sex marriages, 33 it is simply wrong to
suggest that a legislature would be prohibited from allowing such a
union if it so desired. 34 Legislatures are not prevented from recognizing same-sex marriages because of some externally imposed definition
of the term, and courts must stop implying that legislative bodies are
not responsible for the definitions they create.
The importance of the difference between a legislature's choosing
not to recognize same-sex marriages and the legislature's being precluded from recognizing same-sex marriages has not been appreciated. The legal analysis of the relevant issues is very different if the
nonrecognition is a legislative choice rather than something that
would be ultra vires for the legislature to change.35 When the Halla§ 2-201 (1991) ("Only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.");
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.01 (West 1990) ("Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between a man and a woman. .. ").
31. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
32. Id. at 185-86.
33. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 983 n.5 (suggesting that the Baker court correctly inferred that the Minnesota legislature had not intended to allow same-sex
marriages).
34. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1192 n.8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
35. For example, insofar as localities are prohibited from granting domestic partnership benefits because doing so would be ultra vires, the localities cannot be blamed
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han court wrote that the appellants could not marry because of their
"own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined,"' 36 the court implied that the state of Kentucky could not be
blamed even if such a prohibition was discriminatory.37 Yet, if the
state of Kentucky was the entity responsible for defining the term for
legal purposes,
then the court's analysis was at best simply question3
begging. 8
Where the state itself is the entity defining the relevant term, the
definition must be viewed in the same way that any other legislative
classification would be viewed-to be valid, it must be reasonably related to the promotion of a legitimate goal. 39 Legislatures cannot
avoid having their statutes subject to judicial review simply by using
definitions to accomplish their legislative aims. Otherwise, a legislature unable to justify a prohibition on interreligious or interracial marriages might avoid judicial review simply by defining marriage in such
a way that interreligious or interracial marriages were not "true"
marriages. 40
In Loving v. Virginia,4 the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's
ban on interracial marriages. If Virginia currently wanted to ban such
marriages, it could not do so by simply offering a definition of marriage that did not include
such unions,4 1 as ithas done with respect to
43
marriages.
same-sex
One might conclude that Virginia can definitionally preclude intrasexual marriages, but not interracial ones, because it has already
recognized some of the latter unions but none of the former. Yet, this
analysis would be faulty. Were the Supreme Court to overrule Loving, the state could grandfather those marriages that had been recognized between 1967 (when the Court decided Loving) and the date
for failing to do so. See City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E2d 517, 520 (Ga. 1995)
("[Clities in this state may not enact ordinances defining family relationships."); Lilly
v. City of Minneapolis, No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *10 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 3, 1994) (holding that the legislature did not intend to allow cities "to give the
same benefits to employees with domestic partners as to employees who are married"), aff'd, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Mlnn. CL App. 1995); see also Craig A. Bowman &
Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic PartnershipOrdinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1164, 1198-99 (1992) (discussing
home-rule limits for localities).
36. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
37. A judge on the D.C. Court of Appeals adopted a similar tack. See Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 361 (D.C. 1995) (Terry, J., concurring).
38. See Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexaminationof Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L Rev. 301, 307 (1984) ("This
reasoning, however, merely begs the question because the state is ultimately responsible for the particular definition of marriage it chooses to adopt.").
39. See infra notes 109-212 and 230-416 and accompanying text for a discussion of
whether heightened or strict scrutiny is required for such a classification.
40. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 984-86.
41. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 985-89.
43. See Va. Code Ann. § 20-452 (Michie 1995).
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that its definitional preclusion of interracial marriages would go into
effect, but prevent Virginia residents from making such marriages in
the future.'
In Baehr v. Lewin,4 5 a plurality of the Supreme Court of Hawaii
held that Hawaii's prohibition of same-sex marriage involved sex discrimination, and could only be justified if it promoted a compelling
state interest.46 On remand, the lower court will decide whether the
state's interest is sufficiently compelling and narrowly tailored to justify this statutory distinction. The lower court will not be deciding
whether same-sex individuals are definitionally precluded from marrying-that question, which is logically prior to the question of
whether the statute will survive strict scrutiny,47 has already been answered in the negative.
It might be expected that no post-Baehr court would hold that
same-sex marriages are precluded by definition, because Hawaii may
actually come to recognize same-sex marriages. Further, it might be
expected that when other states pass legislation explicitly refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages, they implicitly accept that such unions
are not definitionally precluded. This might induce courts to realize
that they cannot in good faith simply dispose of the relevant substantive issues by appealing to the definitional preclusion argument.
These points notwithstanding, one judge in Dean v. Districtof Columbian" concluded that it makes no "difference that the District of Columbia, or any agency of its government, discriminates against these
two appellants by refusing to allow them to enter into a legal status
which the sameness of their gender prevents them from entering in
the first place. '4 9 Yet, it is difficult to understand how a judge could
conclude that "appellants cannot enter into a marriage because the
very nature of marriage makes it impossible for them to do so'' 50 when
44. See In re Paquet's Estate, 200 P. 911, 913 (Or. 1921). In this case, the court
quoted the then applicable statutory authority:
Hereafter it shall not be lawful within this state for any white person male,
or female, to intermarry with any Negro, Chinese, or any person having onefourth or more negro, Chinese, or Kanaka blood, or any person having more
than one-half Indian blood; and all such marriages, or attempted marriages,
shall be absolutely null and void.
Id. (quoting 1921 Or. Laws § 2163 (repealed by 1951 Or. Laws ch. 455, § 2)).

45. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsiderationgranted in part,875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
46. Id at 67 (plurality opinion).

47. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (suggesting

that the conceptual definition of marriage is logically prior to equal protection and
due process analyses), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982).
48. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).

49. Id. at 361 (Terry, J., concurring). But see William M. Hohengarten, Note,

Same-Sex Marriageand the Right of Privacy, 103 Yale LJ. 1495, 1496 (1994) ("There

is nothing intrinsic to the legal institution of marriage that excludes same-sex couples
from it.").
50. Dean, 653 A.2d at 362 (Terry, J., concurring).
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the state of Hawaii may actually come to recognize such marriages. It
is even more difficult to understand such a position when the Baehr
decision was cited by a different judge in the very opinion using the
definitional preclusion argument. I
At the time the Hawaii Supreme Court was deciding Baehr, the Hawaii legislature had not explicitly limited marriage to opposite-sex
couples. The court had to decide whether the Hawaii legislature (a)
had intended to permit same-sex marriages because they had not been
expressly precluded, or (b) had not intended to permit same-sex marriage despite their not having been explicitly precluded. The Baehr
court rightly inferred that the legislature had not intended to permit
same-sex marriagess' and, instead, held that the state's refusal to recognize
same-sex marriages involved discrimination on the basis of
53
sex.
In Dean, Judge Ferren recognized that the Baehr decision was
based on state constitutional grounds rather than on a recognition
that, absent specific language to the contrary, the evolving definition
of marriage mandated that same-sex couples be allowed to marryf54
Presumably, this was important to Judge Ferren because he had to
decide how to interpret the relevant local statutes. The D.C. statutes
5
were silent as to whether same-sex marriages were permissible,
although the Code did include certain unions that would not be
recognized. 6
Judge Ferren may have believed that if the evolving notion of marriage clearly included same-sex unions, then the District of Columbia
would have to recognize same-sex marriages based on a plain meaning
interpretation of the relevant statutes.' Because the Baehr decision
was based on state constitutional grounds, Judge Ferren may have felt
bolstered in his belief that the evolving notion of marriage did not
clearly include same-sex unions and thus that he should look at other
factors to determine legislative intent. 53
The important issue here is not what the plain meaning of marriage
includes nor whether plain meaning jurisprudence should incorporate
51. See id. at 316 n.13 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. In 1994, the Hawaii Legislature manifested its intention that the marriage laws
permit only unions between opposite-sex couples. See 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217.
53. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64.
54. Dean, 653 A.2d at 316 n.13 (stating that the Baezr decision was "premised on
state constitutional grounds, not on statutory interpretation applying an evolving definition of marriage").
55. The relevant D.C. statutes do not address whether same-sex marriages are permitted. See D.C. Code Ann. § 30-101 to § 30-121 (1981).
56. See D.C. Code Ann. § 30-101 (1981) (specifying incest restrictions only).
57. See Dean, 653 A.2d at 312 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Citing our well-known interpretive criteria, appellants stress that we should
focus, first, on the plain words of the statute.").
58. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 986 (suggesting that where definitions will not
help determine legislative intent, other factors should be considered).
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the common understanding of the relevant terms at the time the legislation was enacted 59 rather than at the time the legislation is to be
enforced. 60 Rather, the points here are simply that plain meaning can
no longer be used to exclude same-sex marriages and that courts must
stop using the definitional preclusion argument if they wish to preserve even an appearance of acting or judging in good faith.
B. Family
Closely connected to the issue of how to define marriage is the issue
of how to define family. Often, this issue has arisen in the context of
zoning regulations, although more recently it has arisen, in a variety of
other contexts. 6 '
Courts have often been unsympathetic to attempts by localities to
prevent groups of individuals from living together in certain geographical areas by saying that such groups are not families. For example, in
Berger v. State,62 the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to decide
whether a group composed of a married couple and several children
who were neither biologically related to the adults nor to each other
nonetheless constituted a family. The court decided that they did.63
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that zoning regulations incorporating a one-family requirement often work irrational
harms. 64 Such harms may be avoided by using a functional definition
59. Judge Ferren discussed the legislative history behind the District of Columbia
marriage statute. Dean, 653 A.2d at 310-12 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. If one uses the former method, one may be more likely to capture the intent
behind the legislation. By incorporating anachronistic meanings, however, one may
not be giving adequate notice to individuals regarding what they may or may not do.
61. See infra notes 62-105 and accompanying text.
62. 364 A.2d 993 (NJ. 1976).
63. Id. at 998 ("That these children are unrelated in a biological way to each other
and to these parents does not negate the fact that they live and function as a family
entity."); see also City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758-59 (N.Y. 1974)
("[A]n ordinance may restrict a residential zone to occupancy by stable families occupying single-family homes, but neither by express provision nor construction may it
limit the definition of family to exclude a household which in every but a biological
sense is a single family.").
64. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 281 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1971)
("[T]hese 'family' definitions and prohibitory ordinance provisions preclude so many
harmless dwelling uses... that'they must be held to be so sweepingly excessive, and
therefore legally unreasonable, that they must fall in their entirety."). Similarly, a
lower New Jersey court held that:
A general municipal restriction of occupancy of dwelling units to groups of
persons all of whom are related to each other by blood, marriage or adoption is unreasonably restrictive of the ordinary and natural utility of such
property as dwellings for people, and of the right of unrelated people in
reasonable number to have recourse to common housekeeping facilities in
circumstances free of detriment to the general health, safety and welfare.
Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 271 A.2d 430, 434 (NJ App. Div.
1970).
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of family. 65 The functional approach was used by courts holding that
the following groups constituted a family for zoning purposes: ten
nonbiologically related students,6 a group of nurses,6 7 a group of
priests,' and a group of nuns.6 9
It should not be thought that individuals who qualify as family for
one purpose will therefore qualify as family for other purposes as well.
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,7 the New York Court of Appeals
characterized two individuals who had a long-term gay relationship as
constituting a family. The court discussed a "more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family [that] includes two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence."'" Because
the two individuals constituted a family, Miguel Braschi could not be
evicted when his life partner, Leslie Blanchard, died, even though
Blanchard was the sole tenant of record.
Courts have declined to use this functional definition of family in a
variety of other contexts. In a New York case, Sandra Rovira and her
two children sought to be declared beneficiaries of a life insurance
policy when Rovira's life partner, Marjorie Forlini, died.72 As in Braschi, this relationship was "characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence" 7 3-the two had pooled their resources, shared responsibility for important decisions, jointly owned
their home, and taken vacations together. 74 They had been together
for twelve years and had formalized their relationship in a ceremony
in which they had exchanged rings and vows.75 Nonetheless, because
the court used a legal rather than a functional definition of family, the
benefits were denied.76 Other courts have denied life partners dental
65. Cf.Donald L. Beschle, Defining the Scope of the ConstitutionalRight to Marry
More Than Tradition, Less Than Unlimited Autonomy, 70 Notre Dame L Rev. 39,55
(1994) (The core of family "can be rather simply stated as a sense of commitment and
duty to another or a group of others, transcending duty to the community at large.").
66. See Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888 (NJ. 1990).
67. See Robertson v. Western Baptist Hospital, 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App.
1954).
68. See Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 66
N.W.2d 627, 630 (Wis. 1954).
69. See Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
70. 543 N.E2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
71. Id. at 53-54; see also In re Adult Anonymous I, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198,201 (App.
Div. 1982) ("[T]he best description of a family is a continuing relationship of love and
care, and an assumption of responsibility ....
").
72. Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also In re Cooper, 592
N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (App. Div. 1993) (rejecting the argument that Braschi requires that
the "traditional definition of the term 'surviving spouse' must be rejected, and replaced with a broader definition which would include the petitioner").
73. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989).
74. Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1064.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1072.
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benefits,77 insurance benefits,78 sick leave,79 or the right to elect
against a will.80
When individuals seek to marry their partners (whether of the same
or opposite sex), they do so for a variety of reasons. 8 ' Some do so for
the economic benefits or, perhaps, for the security that comes from
knowing that one's partner will be provided for should one die. While
same-sex couples have alternative ways to achieve some of these benefits,' for example, by naming each other in their wills or by making
other legal agreements, there is no guarantee that such wills will sur77. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410,412 (Ct. App.
1985).
78. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992).
79. Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 521, 522 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994).
80. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur. Ct. 1990) (holding that
same-sex partner does not "have any right or standing to elect against decedent's
will"), aff'd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y.
1993).
Federal courts have sometimes upheld classifications based on the family unit and
have sometimes struck them down. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S.
1, 7-9 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinances that prohibited more than two unrelated
individuals from living in certain areas) with City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1995) (holding that a zoning ordinance based on the family unit
was not exempt from the Fair Housing Act prohibition of discrimination against the
handicapped); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (striking
down a zoning ordinance that defined family in such a way that extended families
might not be allowed to live together) and United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (holding that a statutory classification denying food stamp
benefits to households containing unrelated persons was unconstitutional).
81. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw.) (plurality opinion) (specifying a
number of marital rights and benefits), reconsiderationgranted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 Gonz. L. Rev. 91, 92 (1990) ("Marriage confers certain legal and economic
benefits on the partners including property rights, tax breaks, veterans' and social
security benefits, testamentary benefits, recovery for loss of consortium, employment
benefits, lower insurance premiums, spousal testimonial privileges, financial support
upon separation, and status as next-of-kin to make medical decisions or burial arrangements."); Mary F. Gardner, Note, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much Ado
About Nothing?, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 361, 366-67 (1990) (discussing benefits extended to
family members); John Charles Hayes, Note, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the
Principleof Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 375, 390-91 (1990) (discussing various marital
benefits); Trosino, supra note 23, at 96 (discussing legal and economic benefits of marriage); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1508, 1604 (1989) (discussing the repercussions of the same-sex marriage ban) [hereinafter Developments]; Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A ConstitutionalTest and
a Legislative Solution, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 193, 198-99 (1979) (discussing the disabilities
that result from the inability of gays and lesbians to marry).
82. But see Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage,and the Same-Sex Couple, 12
Cardozo L. Rev. 681, 683 (1990) ("Until gay and lesbian couples are allowed entry
into the status of marriage, they will be forced to turn to inadequate legal mechanisms
that may answer some of their legal dilemmas, but, ultimately, do not provide the
status and legal recognition such couples need.").
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vive a challenge by distant relativess3 or that contractual agreements
will be held legally enforceable.'
Individuals seeking to marry their same-sex partners may also be
seeking numerous nonmaterial benefits.85 For some couples, these
benefits are more important than the material ones. 6 The couple may
wish to make a public commitment and to obtain public recognition of
that commitment. 8 Indeed, the public nature of that commitment
may be precisely what is most unsettling for opponents of same-sex
marriage.8s Thus, it would be inaccurate to describe cavalierly the
83. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L
Rev. 187, 192 ("When gay people provide for their life partners through wills, courts
often uphold challenges by distant relatives.").
84. Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 Temp. L. Rev. 511, 522 (1990).

85. Buchanan, supranote 18, at 571 ("[N]onrecognition of same-sex marriage deprives such couples of the material, emotional, and psychological benefits that legal
recognition of their relationship would bring."). As one commentator noted,
Perhaps most important to gays, legal marriage may provide a measure of
social acceptance by legitimizing the relationship, and facilitating the kind of
social support-from families, friends, colleagues, and employers-traditionally accorded heterosexual married couples. Same-sex couples are often
denied this external support because of societal attitudes that generally disapprove of gay relationships.
Trosino, supra note 23, at 97; see also Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage,82
Yale LJ. 573, 580 (1973) ("[T]he formal status of marriage might reasonably be
viewed as enhancing the stability, respectability, and emotional depth of any relationship between two individuals, regardless of whether the relationship is homosexual or
heterosexuaL").
86. Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in
ConstitutionalPerspective,24 U.C. Davis L Rev. 677, 693 (1991) ("What matters most
... is the state's official expression, recognizing the couple as a couple.").
87. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L. 624,
651, 684 (1980). Professor Karst notes that:
The homosexual couple who wish to enter a formal marriage will... be
looking for... the opportunity to say something about who they are and to
obtain community recognition of their relationship.
... Such a status would mean not only that they would have the same
opportunity as heterosexual couples to make the public self-identifying
statements implicit in marriage, but also that the state recognized their status
as an acceptable one in society rather than one deserving of stigma.

Id
88. Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on
the Legal History of Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L Rev. 1643, 1659
(1993) ("An attempt to marry may be the most threatening form of gay coupling ..
Marriage is a demand on the part of a gay couple that the society do even more than
tolerate them, that it affirmatively give recognition to their coupled status."). As another commentator noted,
Recognizing same-sex marriages would require society not only to admit
that gay men and lesbians do have committed relationships, but also would
place a positive societal value on those bonds. In addition, even some progressive heterosexuals shrink in horror from 'gay marriage,' because the fact
that same-sex relationships are recognized by the state means that those
bonds are, a fortiori, 'flaunted' (which merely means publicly displayed).
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state's ban on same-sex marriage as an instance in which the "government merely refuses to bestow its 'blessing' on [same-sex] relationships by officially designating them 'marriages.' '"89 Numerous
interests of great importance are at stake and thus same-sex marriage
should not be thought a "mere" benefit that the state may refuse to
confer at will. 90
C. Adult Adoptions
Because of the inability of gays and lesbians to enter into a marriage recognized by the state, some have tried to adopt their lovers by
making use of the mechanism of adult adoption, thereby legally assuring that the adoptee will be entitled to some of the benefits of family.
If the partner has been legally adopted, other family members may be
prevented from later contesting a will that names the partner as a beneficiary.9 There are certain difficulties with this option, however,
even if one is able to overcome a variation of the definitional preclusion attack.
The concept of one individual adopting his lover might seem to be
an abuse of the adoption process. 92 That would be true were adoption
reserved for relationships that involved some kind of parent-child relationship. 93 Adult adoptions, however, have long "served as a legal
mechanism for achieving economic, political and social objectives
rather than the stereotype parent-child relationship.19 4 It is difficult
to imagine what kind of adult adoption would be better qualified to
fulfill economic, political, and social objectives than a gay or lesbian
adult adoption-it would serve economic goals (assuring that the
partner would get economic benefits that might otherwise be difficult
to assure), political goals (promoting equal rights for gays and lesbians), and social goals (both on a societal and a personal level).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner'sSex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 Yale LJ. 333, 378 (1992).
89. Beschle, supra note 65, at 85 (emphasis added).
90. For a discussion of a related argument that the military's exclusionary policy
towards gay, lesbian, and bisexual people involves a mere denial of a privilege to
serve one's country, see Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't
Telf" On Deference, Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 375, 453-54
(1995).
91. See In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528 (Fam. Ct.
1981) ("[T]he adoptee testified that his family did not approve of the relationship, and
he apparently feared that attempts might be made to set aside property arrangements
between the parties if they were not legally adoptive father and adopted son.").
92. In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198,200 (App. Div. 1982) (suggesting
that it may at first seem "a perversion of the adoption process for lovers to adopt one
another").
93. See Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 3107.02 (Anderson 1989) (stating that an adult
may be adopted only if totally and permanently disabled, mentally retarded, or had
child-parent relationship as minor).
94. Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
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In New York, the law "is well settled that adoption of an adult by an
adult is permissible so long as the parties' purpose is neither insincere
nor fraudulent."9 5 Notwithstanding the permissibility of adults adopting adults for economic, political, and social objectives, some courts
have been reluctant to approve a gay adult adoption because they are
unwilling to appear to be condoning gay families. 96 The Court of Appeals of New York has held that adult adoption is "not a quasi-matrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with a legal
imprimatur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual or homosexual,"' suggesting that the New York Legislature must amend the
adoption statute if lovers are to be able to adopt one another.98 Yet,
there is good reason to believe that the court was misrepresenting the
then-current law,99 especially considering that such adoptions had already taken place. 10° Nonetheless, New York no longer allows such
adoptions, although Delaware does. 10 1
Even had the Court of Appeals not pretended that the legislature
had defined adoption to be reserved for parent-child relationships, t '
and thus even had the court not made use of a nonexistent definition
to prevent lesbians and gays from adopting their lovers, there would
be other problems with using adult adoption to create gay and lesbian
families. Because certain benefits may only be available to spouses or
dependent minors, those benefits would not be available to adult
adoptees who, although family, would not be characterized as
95. Id at 199.
96. In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527 (Faro. Ct. 1981)
("The admitted homosexual relationship gave the Court reason to pause. The Court
does not wish to allow the adoption statute to be used as a shield for the protection of
homosexuality, or even to give the appearance of approving or encouraging such
practice, much less express approval"). But see In re The Adoption of Swanson, 623
A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993) ("The adoption had two purposes-to formalize the close
emotional relationship that had existed between them for many years and to facilitate
their estate planning."); Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 201 ("[T]he parties...
wish to formalize themselves as a family unit, for the purposes of publicly acknowledging their emotional bond and more pragmatically to unify their property rights.").
97. In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984).
98. Id. at 427. The court held that:
If the adoption laws are to be changed so as to permit sexual lovers, homosexual or heterosexual, to adopt one another for the purpose of giving a
nonmatrimonial legal status to their relationship, or if a separate institution
is to be established for the same purpose, it is for the Legislature, as a matter
of State public policy, to do so.
Id.
99. See id. at 428-29 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
100. See Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198; Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d
527.
101. See In re The Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095 (Del 1993).
102. See Robert Paul P., 471 N.E2d at 428 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "no
other conclusion is possible than that the Legislature has not conditioned adult adoption upon there being a parent-child relationship").

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. (A

spouses. 10 3 Insofar as one of the reasons to create a family is to assure
that one's partner will receive certain benefits, one may be unable to
achieve that result through adult adoption.
Another factor to consider when deciding whether an adult adoption would be an appropriate option is that adoptions are irrevocable.' 4 While those considering becoming a family (whether through
marriage or adoption) would look forward to spending a long time
together, current divorce statistics for heterosexual couples
suggest
0 5
that an irrevocable arrangement may not be prudent.
Courts have used definitions in a variety of ways to prevent lesbian
and gay individuals from creating families with their same-sex partners. Sometimes, courts have used definitions as shields to deflect
blame from legislatures, as if dictionaries rather than legislative bodies
are responsible for legally defining who may marry whom. 10 6 At other
times, courts have recognized that legislatures are responsible for definitions and then have imputed intentions to legislators regarding
particular definitions
when there has been no basis for such an
07
imputation.
It should not be thought that all difficulties will cease once courts
stop using definitions illicitly. On the contrary, difficulties may increase because courts will then be forced to deal with substantive issues, for example, analyzing any implicated equal protection issues.
These enterprises are much more subtle, and erroneous analyses may
be much more difficult to recognize. Happily, the Hawaii Supreme
Court has recognized that a state refusal to recognize same-sex marriages implicates the Equal Protection Clause.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION

The Baehr plurality held that Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban had
to be subjected to strict scrutiny because the prohibition discriminated
on the basis of sex.108 To understand this holding, it is necessary to
understand some key elements of equal protection jurisprudence.
103. See Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 415 (Ct.
App. 1985) (noting that under California law, "a homosexual's same-sex partner can
never be a 'spouse' "); Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosexual Marriage, the
Changing American Family, and the HeterosexualRight to Privacy, 24 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 347, 357-58 (1993) ("[A]dult adoption does not assure employment benefits be-

cause most benefits are available only to the worker's minor children.").
104. Heeb, supra note 103, at 358 ("[A]dult adoption is an inadequate marriage
alternative because of its irrevocability."); Zimmer, supra note 82, at 692 ("The greatest disadvantage of adult adoption is its irrevocable nature.").
105. See Jonathan Peterson, GOP Puts Family Values in Spotlight, L.A. Times, Aug.

19, 1992, at A4 ("[H]alf of all first marriages now end in divorce.").
106. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
108. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw.) (plurality opinion) ("[Haw. Rev. Stat.]
§ 572-1, on its face and as applied, regulates access to the marital status and its con-
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Suspect Classes

The Supreme Court has made clear that it will carefully examine
statutory classifications that adversely affect suspect classes or fundamental interests. 109 A suspect class is a group of individuals meeting
certain criteria. The class should be "discrete and insular."' l The defining characteristic of the group must be something that cannot readily be controlled"' and that the state may not legitimately
13
disadvantage."12 Moreover, the characteristic must be stigmatizing.
The group must have been "subjected to unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities.""' 4

If a group is designated as a suspect class, any statutes picking out
that class for adverse treatment will be examined with strict scrutiny.
Usually, a court's strict scrutiny of a classification will result in its invalidation, 115 because
classifications based on suspect criteria must be
"narrowly tailored" 116 and "supported by a compelling interest.""' 7
The Supreme Court has already recognized several
groups as hav2
2ing suspect status: race,1 8 nationality," 9 religion, and alienage.' '
The Court has also recognized that certain classes are quasi-suspect.
These classes have the same indicia as do the suspect classes, although
not to the same extent. Women' and individuals born out-of-wedcomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' sex."), reconsideration
grantedin part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
109. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If a statute invades a 'fundamental' right or discriminates
against a 'suspect' class, it is subject to strict scrutiny."). For a discussion of whether
same-sex marriage involves a fundamental right, see infra notes 212-416 and accompanying text.
110. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (citing United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
111. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (holding that it is inappropriate to punish a child for illegitimacy when the child is not responsible for being
illegitimate).
112. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that legislation must not
be "arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State to effect").
113. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (separating children
solely because of their race may cause "a feeling of inferiority.., unlikely ever to be
undone"); Karst, supra note 86, at 728 (suggesting that the function of the sodomy law
is "to stigmatize lesbians and gay men for their sexual orientation").
114. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
115. Id. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
117. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
120. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (discussing "suspect
lines like race or religion"); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(discussing "inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage").
121. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
122. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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lock'2 3 each constitute quasi-suspect classes. Classifications implicating quasi-suspect classes "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." 24
The Court seems unlikely to recognize new suspect classes, 125
although there remain "classes, not now classified as 'suspect', that are
unfairly burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members.' 26 Indeed, although not recognized
as deserving heightened or strict scrutiny, the class composed of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual individuals seems to have the relevant indicia of
suspectness, at least insofar as one can infer what those indica are by
examining the classes that have already been recognized as suspect or
quasi-suspect. 27 Regrettably, courts have used criteria to exclude lesbians and gays from suspect or quasi-suspect status which, if applied
to groups already recognized as having that status, would have precluded these groups from being so recognized. 28 In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,129 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied that lesbians and gays "comprise an
identifiable class,' 130 arguing that they "are not identifiable 'on sight'
unless they elect to be so identifiable." " ' The Equality Foundation
court failed to notice that the same criterion might have prevented
religion, nationality, or illegitimacy from receiving heightened or strict
scrutiny.
The point here is not to discuss the merits of the indicia, but merely
to demonstrate that they should be applied consistently by the courts.
It is difficult to understand how the courts considering whether bisexuals, gays, and lesbians comprise a class meriting heightened or strict
scrutiny can claim to be judging in good faith when the standards chosen, if applied consistently in the past, would have32 precluded the recognition of any suspect or quasi-suspect classes.'
123. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
124. Craig,429 U.S. at 197.
125. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (The Court "has apparently lost interest in recognizing further
'fundamental' rights and 'suspect' classes.").
126. Id. at 320 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See Strasser, supra note 90, at 390-427; see generally Mark Strasser, Suspect
Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64
Temp. L. Rev. 937 (1991) (arguing that homosexuals more closely meet the suspect
class criteria that other groups recognized as suspect or quasi-suspect).
128. See Strasser, supra note 90, at 390-91 ("[T]he reasons often cited to establish
why gay and lesbian people do not comprise such a class, if applied to those who
currently enjoy that status, would entail that no currently recognized classes 'deserve'
that status.").
129. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
130. Id.at 267.
131. It.
132. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) ("The standard implicitly adopted by the Ninth Circuit would disqualify every group from suspect or
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The lack of good faith is especially disappointing in an area where
good faith is so essential. The Supreme Court has recognized that it
would "be impracticable and unwise to attempt to lay down any general rule or definition on the subject [deciding what the Equal Protection Clause protects] that would include all cases."' 33 Yet, the lack of
an easily applied general rule does not imply that courts are free to
ignore those implicit standards that have already been adoptedcourts have a responsibility to apply standards that at the very least
might credibly account for the Supreme Court's suspect class jurisprudence. When courts claim to apply the appropriate standards but offer an analysis that, if applied generally, would do away with suspect
and quasi-suspect classes, the courts undermine confidence both in
their decisions in particular and in their integrity generally.
When classifications involving nonfundamental interests do not adversely affect a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the classification must
merely be "rationally based."'3' In F S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,35 the Court explained that classifications must be "reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."'136
The Court tends to be deferential when deciding whether a statutory classification meets the rational basis test. Because the "machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play
in its joints,"' 37 the Court has held that a "classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against [the Equal Protection
Clause] merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality."'13
Yet, even if a court should be deferential, that does not mean that it
should abdicate its responsibility to judge. 139 In Louisville Gas &
Electric Co. v. Coleman," ° the Court made clear that "the equal protection clause means that the rights of all persons must rest upon the
quasi-suspect status. Blacks, women, aliens, or any group which has obtained some
form of legislative protection would forfeit the benefits of heightened scrutiny."),
rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993).
133. Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).
134. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
135. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
136. Id. at 415.
137. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931).
138. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
139. See Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 301 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("[Djeference...
does not require the Judiciary to abdicate its authority under Article fII to decide
whether or not an individuil's right to equal protection under the Federal Constitution has been violated." (quoting Dubbs v. CIA, 769 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 n3 (N.D.
Cal. 1990)). The Supreme Court has used the rational basis test to invalidate state
actions. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (using the
rational basis test to overturn denial of zoning permit for home for mentally
handicapped).
140. 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
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Thus, "mere difference is

to justify treating one group differently from another if

the two are similarly situated. The Court recognized in Gulf, Colorado & Santa F6 Railway v. Ellis 43 that it is always possible to find
some basis upon which to distinguish between two similar but nonidentical groups-"the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to
relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 44 As the Court explained in Ellis, "[A]rbitrary
selection can never be justified by calling it classification.' 45 This is
especially true where the classification involves "clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes,' 46 and' 47
even more
true when that classification is "of an unusual character.'
In Baxstrom v. Herold,48 the Court wrote, "Equal protection does
not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for
which the classification is made."' 4 If indeed the "Equal Protection
Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all
caste-based and invidious class-based legislation,"' 150 courts must be
vigilant "lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are
made against groups or types of individuals5 in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.' '
Statutory classifications raise several issues. Courts must determine
whether the asserted state interest itself is legitimate. As the Court
made clear in Palmore v. Sidoti, 52 "The Constitution cannot control
...prejudices

but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be

outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect."' 5 3 Where bias is playing a role, the result154is more
likely to reflect "prejudice than legitimate public concerns."'
Even if the asserted interest is legitimate, a court will have to determine whether that interest is in fact promoted by the classification.
Unless courts are willing to examine the relation between the statute
and the asserted interest, "the mere incantation of a proper state purpose 1 55 will make the statute immune from judicial review. Thus,
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 37.
hd (emphasis omitted).
165 U.S. 150 (1897).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 159.

146. Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).

147. Id.
148. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

l at 111.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982).
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Id at 433.
Id. at 432.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
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promotion of the public welfare-a clearly legitimate purpose-could
be used to justify any statutory classification. The Supreme Court has
held that in addition to assuring that the state's interests are legitimate, courts must determine whether the "classifications drawn in a
statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.,', 6 In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,"s the Court explained why it is necessary
to examine the link between the asserted interest and the method selected to promote it "The purpose of requiring that close relationship
is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through
reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application 158
of
s
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about.., proper roles.
Even if the classification is reasonable in light of the state's purpose,
and even if the state's purpose is legitimate, courts must assure that
the statutes are applied fairly. A rationally sustainable classification,
if "applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights,"' 9 will be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The question at hand is whether the state refusal to recognize samesex marriages involves an unjust and illegal discrimination. Arguably,
it does because it involves discrimination on the basis of a classification that has already been recognized as meriting heightened scrutiny.
B.

Sex Discrimination

The Baehr plurality held that the Hawaii marriage statute "on its
face and as applied, regulates access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' sex."1 "0
Although sex is a quasi-suspect classification on federal constitutional
grounds, it is a suspect classification according to Hawaii's constitution, and thus a statute discriminating on the basis of sex will be subjected to strict scrutiny.1 61 The classification must be "justified by
compelling state interests" 62 and must be "narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary
abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional
63
rights.'
156. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
157. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
158. Id. at 725-26.
159. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
160. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw.), reconsiderationgranted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
161. See Eric J. Toulon, Call the Caterer: Hawaiito Host FirstSame-Sex Marriage,3
S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 109, 119 (1993).
162. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (plurality opinion).
163. Id. (plurality opinion).
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1. Facial Discrimination
The Baehr plurality reasoned that because a man may marry a woman but not a man, and because a woman may marry a man but not a
woman, the Hawaii statute discriminated on the basis of sex. 164 In Orr
v. Orr, 65 the Supreme Court struck down an alimony system that disadvantaged males, noting that "Mr. Orr bears a burden he would not
bear were he female."'16 6 Thus, the Court found that Orr was being
disadvantaged because of his sex, and held that the statutory scheme
was unconstitutional. 67
In Orr,the Court made clear that not all males would be disadvantaged by the statute under examination. "As compared to a genderneutral law placing alimony obligations on the spouse able to pay, the
present Alabama statutes give an advantage only to the financially
secure wife whose husband is in need."' 68 Thus, the Court invalidated
the statutory scheme, despite the fact that it did not adversely affect
all males.
Arguably, the alimony system at issue in Orr was unconstitutional
because it imposed a burden on some males but on no females. But
the Hawaii marital statute imposed a burden on both sexes. Indeed,
the dissent in Baehr argued that the statute did not involve an equal
protection violation because all males and females were treated alike.
"A male cannot obtain a license to marry another male, and a female
cannot obtain a license to marry another female.' 6 9
The Baehr plurality rejected the dissent's argument, correctly pointing out that the Supreme Court had rejected an analogous line of reasoning in Loving.17 0 The Loving Court had to evaluate the State of
Virginia's argument that "because its miscegenation statutes punish
equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial
marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications,
164. See id. at 60 (plurality opinion).

165. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
166. Id. at 273.
167. Id. at 282-83.
168. Id. at 282.
169. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 71 (Haw.) (Heen, J., dissenting), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
argued that:
The State concedes that the statute prohibits men from doing what women
may do, namely, engage in sexual activity with men. However, the State
argues that it likewise prohibits women from doing something which men
can do: engage in sexual activity with women. We believe it applies equally
to men and women because it prohibits both classes from engaging in sexual
activity with members of their own sex. Thus, there is no denial of equal
protection on that basis.
State v. Walsh 713 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Mo. 1986).
170. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68.
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do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. 171
The Supreme Court rejected the "notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove
the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of
all invidious racial discriminations."'" Just as the statute at issue in
Loving discriminated on the basis of race, notwithstanding the fact
that both whites and blacks would be disadvantaged, the statute at
issue in Baehr discriminates on the basis of sex, notwithstanding the
fact that both sexes are disadvantaged by the law.
Arguably, the statute at issue in Baehr discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation rather than on the basis of sex. Yet, on its face, the
173
statute applies to all individuals, regardless of their orientation.
While it may fairly be assumed that most individuals wanting to marry
a same-sex partner will be lesbian, gay, or bisexual, it should not be
assumed that only people with a same-sex orientation will want to
choose this option. For example, some individuals might wvish to
marry someone of the same sex for economic, political, or social
objectives rather than sexual or emotional ones.7 Indeed, bans on
same-sex marriage have been criticized for their overbreadth-they
are not narrowly tailored to discriminate solely against lesbians, bisexuals, and gays. 175
The state might try to tailor its statute more narrowly, for example,
by seeking to make sure that same-sex couples who marry will not
171. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967); see also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S.
583,585 (1883) ("Sect. 4189 applies the same punishment to both offenders, the white
and the black .... The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black,
is the same.").
172. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
173. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting) ("[Haw. Rev. Stat.] § 572-1 treats
everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes. The effect of the statute is to prohibit same sex marriages on the part of professed or non-professed heterosexuals,
homosexuals, bisexuals, or asexuals, and does not effect an invidious
discrimination.").
174. Just as one might wish to adopt another adult for economic reasons, one might
wish to marry one for economic reasons, e.g., so that the person will receive inheritance or insurance benefits. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. But see
Marty Y. Courson, Baehr v. Lewin: Hawaii Takes a Tentative Step to Legalize SameSex Marriage,24 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 41, 62 (1994) ("[A] same-sex couple is, for
all practical purposes, synonymous with a homosexual couple.").
175. See Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to Sunstein, 70 Ind. LJ. 29, 34 (1994) ("A ban on same-sex marriages is not perfectly tailored to further the governmental interest in not giving homosexual relationships
legal recognition since it forbids people of the same sex from entering into a legally
recognized 'marriage' regardless of their sexual proclivities (or lack of same).").
One commentator suggests that discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
is "not invidious" because such individuals have a "propensity to engage in morally
controversial behavior." Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church. Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 393, 437 (1994). Duncan seems not to appreciate that given the number of behaviors that are morally controversial (eating meat, using contraception, promoting
bigotry, etc.), the standard offered would seem to justify much discrimination.
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have sexual relations, but such an approach would, one hopes, have
insurmountable privacy difficulties. If one reads Bowers v. Harwick'17 6
as permitting discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals,177
however,78then perhaps such a requirement would not seem so farfetched.1

2.

Gender Discrimination

Some commentators suggest that same-sex marriage bans involve
discrimination on the basis of gender because such a ban reinforces
traditional sex roles.' 7 9 In Personnel Administratorof Massachusetts
v. Feeney,180 the Supreme Court recognized that "[c]lassifications
based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination.'' s8 Such classifications may not promote the view that the
"female [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family,
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."2
While it may once have been thought that the "natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
176. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
177. See Bradley, supra note 175, at 35 (describing "discrimination against homosexuals" as "Supreme Court-endorsed"); Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil
Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2456, 2471
(1994) ("Bowers v. Hardwick apparently closed the door on any ordinary strict scrutiny attack on equal protection grounds."). But see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-71 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Hardwick simply
did not address the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation or sexual preference itself."), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
178. Cf.Stuart v. State of New Hampshire Div. for Children & Youth Servs., 597
A.2d 1076, 1076 (N.H. 1991) (upholding requirement that foster care applicants "execute a declaration that neither they nor any other adult in their household is 'a homosexual within the statutory definition' ").
179. Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 249 (1994) ("[Compulsory heterosexuality keeps women in relationships in which men exert power over their lives."); Law,
supra note 83, at 231 ("[L]aws barring marriage of two people of the same sex discriminate on the basis of gender."); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 Ind. LJ.1, 20 (1994) ("It is possible to think that the prohibition on samesex marriages, as part of the social and legal insistence on 'two kinds,' is as deeply
connected with male supremacy as the prohibition on racial intermarriage is connected with White Supremacy."); Hohengarten, supra note 49, at 1518 ("[I f genderbased access requirements for marriage serve any purpose, it is only the suspect one of
maintaining gender-based sexual and social roles."); see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Tvo
Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511, 636-37 (1992)
("[R]ecognition of gay couples threatens elements of society that remain committed
to clear distinctions between the appropriate roles of men and women and undermines institutions that support male domination.").
180. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
181. Id. at 273.
182. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
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it for many of the occupations of civil life,"'8 and that the "paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother," 1 statutes that promote such views
will no longer be countenanced even if they are "rationalized by an
attitude of 'romantic paternalism.' ",5
The Supreme Court has not restricted its notion of what constitutes
impermissible role promotion to those classifications promoting the
view that women should stay home and rear the children. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,"s the Court struck down a classification that tended to "perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing
as an exclusively woman's job."1 7 The Court insisted that state classifications be "free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females."'" Classifications based on gender "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women."' 8 9 The Court is especially vigilant to prevent reinforcement of
"archaic and stereotypic notions."''
Discrimination "based on
archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities."' 191
In Craig v. Boren,19 the Court held that because of the "weak congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender
purported to represent,"' 93 the legislatures that had created sex-specific drinking ages had to make some changes-either "realign their
substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion"1 94 or "adopt procedures
for identifying those instances where the sex-centered generalization
actually comported with fact."' 95 One of the questions at issue in this
article is whether statutes prohibiting same-sex marriages involve a
weak congruence between gender and the traits it is supposed to represent and thus need to be changed.
Many of the functions of marriage can be fulfilled as well by a samesex couple as by an opposite-sex couple. A state barring same-sex
marriages must explain why it has made a sex-based distinction. The
state might claim that gender is being used as a proxy for the ability to
procreate through the union of the two parties. Because the ability to
183. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
184. Id.

185. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
186. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

I. at 729.
Id. at 724-25.
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
193. Id. at 199.
194. Id.

195. Id.
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procreate is not a requirement in opposite-sex marriages, 196 it seems
more plausible that the state is using gender to promote its own view
of the proper role of the sexes. 97 The Boren rationale suggests that a
state must either adopt a gender-free classification in its marriage statutes or tailor a classification that more precisely captures gender differences. For example, a state may require that the would-be marital
partners be able and willing to have a child through their union. It is
doubtful, however, that such a marriage requirement would pass constitutional muster.198
The same-sex marriage ban promotes stereotypical gender roles in
various ways. It suggests that marital fulfillment (whether sexual, psychological, or emotional) is only appropriately sought by males from
females and by females from males.' 99 While there is nothing wrong
in seeking such fulfillment from a member of the opposite sex, there is
also nothing wrong in seeking it from a member of the same sex.
Hostility toward gays and lesbians (one manifestation of which is a
same-sex marriage ban) has been linked to other stereotypical attitudes about sex roles.200 Presumably, it is precisely because lesbians,
gays, and bisexuals are allegedly engaging in activities "inappropriate"
for their sex that they are stigmatized and penalized by not being allowed to marry their partners.20 ' Yet, it is not for the state to decide
the proper roles of the sexes,202 especially when no one is harmed by
the adoption of the nontraditional roles.

196. See infra notes 261-306 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.

198. See infra notes 230-348 and accompanying text.
199. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,79 Va. L. Rev. 1419,

1510 (1993) ("The ideology is an essentialism of gender, in which women are naturally
heterosexual and naturally desirous of marrying men, which naturally results in their

bearing children."); Hohengarten, supra note 49, at 1528 ("Not sanctioning same-sex

marriages... reproduces specific gender roles by enforcing a system in which gender
is always relevant to the possibility of intimate relations, and by obsessively focusing
on a single type of sexual conduct in which men and women have set, stereotyped
positions.").
200. Law, supra note 83, at 187, 210 ("[Contemporary legal and cultural contempt
for lesbian women and gay men serves primarily to preserve and reinforce the social
meaning attached to gender.... Sexism and heterosexism are tightly linked."); Sunstein, supra note 179, at 21; see also Fajer, supra note 179, at 617 ("Much of the psychological literature examining homophobia has concluded that support for the
traditional gender-role structure is a primary cause of homophobia.").
201. Koppelman, supra note 179, at 234 ("It should be clear from ordinary experience that the stigmatization of the homosexual has something to do with the homosexual's supposed deviance from traditional sex roles.").

202. Id. at 218 ("Since it began subjecting sex-based classifications to heightened
scrutiny, the Court has never upheld a sex-based classification resting on normative
stereotypes about the proper roles of the sexes.").
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C. OrientationDiscrimination

The Baehr plurality made clear that it was not declaring orientation
a suspect classification. 0 3 While the class of bisexuals, gays, and lesbians should be recognized as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 20, it is
unlikely that this will occur. 2°5 Even if orientation was recognized as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, it is not clear that recognition of samesex marriages would follow,2°6 although the parallel with Loving
would be even stronger.20 7
Suppose that sexual orientation were declared a suspect or quasisuspect category.2 8 If a court nonetheless upheld a state's refusal to
recognize same-sex marriage because, for example, the court found
the state's reasons for the refusal to be sufficiently compelling, then
the state's refusal to accord benefits to same-sex nonmarital partners
would also likely be upheld. Courts addressing the issue would simply
deny that the distinction was based on orientation, because oppositesex nonmarital partners would also be denied the benefits.' 0 Indeed,
courts might well adopt an attitude sub silentio which a Maryland Appeals Court has been willing to make explicit, ranking three couples:
"1) a homosexual couple (male or female); 2) an unmarried heterosexual couple; or 3) a married heterosexual couple, '210 and described
the list as involving a "roughly ascending hierarchy of favor."2" 1 Were
203. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 n.33 (Haw.) (plurality opinion), reconsideration grantedin part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
204. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
206. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 335 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]lassification of homosexuals as a constitutionally protected class would not grant them the right to marry one another.").
207. Loving involved discrimination against a suspect class, and abridgement of a
fundamental right. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
208. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550-51 (D. Kan. 1991) ("There is, the
court believes, no way to analyze the present issue under the guidelines set down by
the Supreme Court and reach any conclusion other than that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is inherently suspect."), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 2445 (1993).
209. See Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 522 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994) ("Because the rule does not classify or differentiate on the basis of sexual
orientation, we conclude that Ross has not established a claim of denial of equal protection or due process."); see also Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 598
(Ct. App. 1992) (holding that insurance benefits did not extend to the policy holder's
same-sex partner); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at
*10-11 (Mlnn. Dist.Ct. June 3,1994) ("All persons, whatever their sexual orientation,
who are not married, are not eligible for benefits for a partner."), aff'd, 527 N.W.2d
107 (Mnn. CL App. 1995); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121,
126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the state could withhold benefits from an employee's unmarried companion).
210. Schochet v. Maryland, 541 A.2d 183, 185 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd, 580
A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
211. Id.; see also David Link, Note, The Tie that Binds: Recognizing Privacy and
the Family Commitments of Same-Sex Couples, 23 Loy. LA. L Rev. 1055, 1083 (1990)
("To the Maryland court, the understood consequence of there being homosexual
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courts to have such a view (notwithstanding orientation's having received suspect or quasi-suspect status), it seems likely that they would
continue to find no constitutional violation in not affording benefits to
same-sex nonmarital partners, even if the state had refused to offer
those partners the opportunity to marry. It is thus not surprising that
one commentator has called same-sex marriage the linchpin that will
determine how a variety of other issues will be decided."'
D. Illegitimates
The Supreme Court has recognized that individuals born out-ofwedlock constitute a quasi-suspect class.2 13 In Parham v. Hughes,1 4
the Court pointed out that "it is unjust and ineffective for society to
express its condemnation of procreation outside the marital relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no way responsible
215
for his situation and is unable to change it."1
For example, "a State
which grants an opportunity for legitimate children to obtain paternal
'2 16
support must also grant that opportunity to illegitimate children.
The Court is unwilling to allow states to adversely affect children
for the alleged sins of their parents-the Court has "expressly considpersons is to rank them at a lower level than heterosexuals without any further analysis."). Some judges might not even realize that they had adopted such a prejudicial
view. See Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909). As Justice Peckham
noted,
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most
difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might
exist in the mind of one ... who was quite positive that he had no bias, and
said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by
anything but the evidence.
Id.
212. Buchanan, supra note 18. Buchanan wrote:
If it is resolved against the power of government to limit marriage to opposite-sex unions, against the power of government to confine marriage to its
traditional opposite-sex moorings, then the legal system, as a practical matter, will have lost its capacity to make distinctions between same-sex and
opposite-sex conduct in any walk of life.
Id. at 544; see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-Of-Law: If We
Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home? 1994 Wis. L. Rev.
1033, 1034-35 (arguing that the public recognition of same-sex marriage would "forever change the landscape of lesbian and gay rights in the United States"); Deborah
M. Henson, Will Same-Sex MarriagesBe Recognized In Sister States?: Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regardingthe Status and
Incidents of Homosexual MarriagesFollowingHawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 J. Fam. L.
551, 557 (1994) (suggesting that permitting same-sex marriages would do more to
eliminate prejudice than any other legal reform).
213. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
214. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
215. Id. at 352; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) ("The parents
have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate children can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.").
216. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982). The Court also held that the "support opportunity provided by the State to illegitimate children must be more than
illusory." Id.
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ered and rejected the argument that a State may attempt to influence
the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children
'
born of their illegitimate relationships."217
Yet, same-sex marriage
bans may well impose hardships on the children of gays and lesbians.
The claim here is not that all children in gay or lesbian households
are illegitimate, because some are born in the context of a marriage
recognized by the state. Rather, the point is that the rationale that
children should not be punished for the "sins" of their parents applies
here as well. Whether the children were born during a previous marriage or were born through either surrogacy or artificial insemination,2 18 they should not be denied the psychological, emotional, or
financial benefits that might accrue if they were in a family recognized
by the state.
Children living with their same-sex parents may not be able to receive benefits from both of their parents as easily as other children
might,219 because of the state refusal to allow the same-sex couple to
marry. For example, should a same-sex couple separate, it might be
difficult to force the nonbiological parent to help support the child,
even if that parent was (nonbiologically) instrumental in bringing
about the birth of that child. While an estoppel argument might be
successful to force the nonbiologically related partner to contribute2 0
this would not offer the kind of protection that would be most desirable. Or, the biological parent might refuse to allow the nonbiological
parent to have any contact with the child, notwithstanding the detriment to the child."' Should the biological parent die, the nonbiological parent might lose custody to the detriment of both the parent and
the child. 22 Justice Scalia apparently sees no constitutional issues
raised by a state's preventing a child from having two parents of the
same sex,223 despite the foreseeable difficulties both for the parents
and the child.
217. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 769.
218. For a discussion of whether parents can be prevented from having children out
of wedlock, see infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
219. Cf Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) ("[A] State may not invidiously
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.").
220. See Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
221. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 218-19 (Ct. App. 1991) (denying lesbian former partner not biologically related to children all contact with the
children despite having played an important role in raising them).
222. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthoodto Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Moterand Other Nontraditional Families,78 Geo. L.. 459 (1990) (analyzing three cases where the death of the
biological mother led to abridgement of the nonbiological parent's rights).
223. Writing the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989),
Justice Scalia wrote, "California law, like nature itsel, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood." Id. at 118.
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A district court in Pennsylvania had to decide whether an unmarried, opposite-sex couple and their children would be entitled to HUD
housing.224 The court discussed all of the opposite-sex couples living
with children who would be denied benefits if the statute were narrowly construed.2 '1 The court wrote, "Whether it is moral or immoral,
wise or unwise, for the parents to spurn marriage, I cannot allow the
sins of the parents to be visited upon their children. ''1 6 It is unclear
whether the court realized that an analogous argument might apply to
lesbian and gay couples who also have children, 7 i.e., that the alleged
immorality of the parents' behavior is being used to disadvantage
their children.2 18
There are several equal protection concerns implicated by a state
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. Such a refusal involves sex
discrimination in that it facially discriminates on the basis of sex and
also in that it involves the state's imposing its own notions of appropriate gender roles. Insofar as states are prohibited from adversely
affecting children because of their parents' alleged misdeeds, there
would seem to be an additional reason that such bans should be struck
down.
Sex discrimination arguments notwithstanding, courts have tended
not to accept that same-sex marriage bans implicate equal protection
concerns. 229 Courts rejecting the equal protection argument must still
examine the substantive due process issues implicated by a refusal to
recognize same-sex unions. Regrettably, just as flawed analyses have
caused courts to take definitional preclusion arguments seriously and
to reject equal protection arguments, flawed analyses have also caused
courts to inappropriately delimit which individual interests are funda224. Hann v. Housing Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
225. See id.at 610.
226. Id.
227. Cf.id.at 607 ("The real concern prompting the floor amendment was the propriety of granting housing assistance to homosexual couples, a question not before me
today.").
228. It of course is not claimed that the behavior of the parents is immoral. See
infra notes 436-40 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Ca. 1980) ("[T]he
Colorado state law which rejects a purported marriage between persons of the same
sex does not violate the due process or equal protection clause of the federal constitution."), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196 (Wash. 1974) ("[W]e agree with the state's contention that
to define marriage to exclude homosexual or any other same-sex relationships is not
to create an inherently suspect legislative classification requiring strict judicial scrutiny to determine a compelling state interest."). But see Dean v. District of Columbia,
653 A.2d 307, 343-44 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("This difference arguably amounts to invidious discrimination because the state
would be withholding from homosexual couples a status that heterosexual couples
could elect to legitimize for themselves the very same conduct ...that homosexual
couples would be helpless to legitimize.").
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mental and to exaggerate how heavily particular state interests should
be weighed.
ll.

FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS

The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution affords
"protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
' 30
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."
Insofar as same-sex marriage is not definitionally precluded, jurists
must address whether the fundamental right to marriage includes the
right to marry a same-sex partner, even if the refusal to recognize
same-sex marriages does not offend the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, because statutory classifications will be examined with heightened or strict scrutiny if the classification violates either the Equal
Protection or the Due Process Clause, courts must still address the
constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban. Courts addressing this
question have suggested that the fundamental right to marry does not
include same-sex marriage because the importance of the right to
marry lies in its allowing individuals to raise their own biological children. This misinterpretation of the relevant case law involves a major
reinterpretation of domestic relations jurisprudence.
When discussing the right to marry, it is important to establish (a)
how important that right is, and (b) why that right is important. Once
these are made clear, courts should not be tempted to accept the kinds
of analyses which allegedly establish that no fundamental rights are
implicated by statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage.
A.

The Fundamental Interest in Marriage

In Loving v. Virginia,"1 the Court recognized that the "freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' 2 The
Court described marriage as "one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival."' 2 3 The fundamental
nature of the right has long been recognized-over seventy years ago,
the Court recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska2"' that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects "the right of the individual ...to marry, establish a home and bring up children."' 5
230. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (plurality opinion).
231. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
232. Id.at 12.
233. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
234. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
235. Id. at 399; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974) ("This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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The Court has spoken glowingly about the institution of marriage.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,2 36 marriage was described as "a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate'2 to
38
the degree of being sacred." '37 Marriage "promotes a way of life,
involves "a harmony in living, '2 39 and a "bilateral loyalty."24 The
Court described marriage as an "association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.""241 In Boddie v.Connecticut,242
the Court recognized "the basic position of the marriage relationship
in this society's hierarchy of values."243 In Santosky v. Kramer,2" the
Court discussed "this Court's historical recognition that freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty inter245
est protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The question then is not whether the right to marry is fundamental-it clearly is, but whether the fundamental right to marry includes
the right to marry one's same-sex partner. That question cannot be
answered without examining the purposes of marriage.
B. Why the Right to Marry Is Fundamental
While courts agree that the right to marry is fundamental, they disagree about why that right is fundamental. That disagreement is due,
at least in part, to the failure of many lower courts to understand or
appreciate the numerous, constitutionally significant functions that
the institution of marriage serves. For example, while the Baehr plurality recognized that "the decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships, 246 it erred in its analysis
of why that is so. Its247misunderstanding is due to its interpretation of
Zablocki v. RedhaiL
The Zablocki Court recognized that the right to marry is of the
same level of importance as the right to have and raise one's children.2' The Court suggested that it "would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life
and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is
236. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

237. Id. at 486.

238. Id.

239. Id.
240. Id.

241. Id.
242.
243.
244.
245.

401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Id. at 374.
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Id. at 753.

246. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993).
247. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
248. Id.at 386.
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the foundation of the family in our society."24 9 The Baehr plurality
looked at this passage and concluded, "Implicit in the Zablocki court's
link between the right to marry, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of procreation, childbirth, abortion, and child rearing, on the
other, is the assumption that the one is simply the logical predicate of
the others."" 0 Yet, there are several reasons why this analysis is
faulty, both from a logical and a legal perspective. Indeed, this analysis is so obviously flawed that it cannot credibly be attributed to the
Supreme Court.
1. Procreation Outside of Marriage
The Baehr analysis notwithstanding, marriage is neither a logical
nor a biological predicate of procreation. While groups disagree
about how to solve or even characterize the problems posed by out-ofwedlock births,2' it is not credible to claim that marriage is a logical

predicate of reproduction,5 because
the illegitimacy rate is high2 and
3
is projected to go higher.
Perhaps it will be thought that the Baehr plurality was simply being
hyperbolic. Marriage is not the logical but the legal predicate of having and raising children. Yet, that analysis must also be rejected.
Marriage is neither a legal predicate of having a child2- 4 nor of raising
249. Id
250. Baehr,852 P.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
251. See4 eg., Thomas B. Edsall, DisillusionedRainbow Coalition Mulls Third-Party
Bid, Wash. Post, May 28, 1995 at A4 ("Jackson and prominent members of the black
clergy voiced their anger over what they see as Republican efforts to turn concerns
over out-of-wedlock births and families without fathers into minority issues."); Judith
Havemann & Barbara Vobejda, Block Grant Welfare Reform Advances: Senate Panel
Says Transfer to States Will Save U.S. $16.8 Billion, Wash. Post, May 27, 1995 at A8
("[A]bortion opponents say provisions in the House welfare reform measure to curb
out-of-wedlock births inevitably would increase the number of abortions."); Tracy
Thompson, Unhitched but Hardly Independent Having No Husband Complicates Escape From Welfare, Wash. Post, May 13,1995 at Al, A10 ("The House-passed welfare
bill would bar cash benefits to unwed mothers younger than 18 to try to discourage
out-of-wedlock births."); Barbara Vobejda, The Debates Over Welfare: Moynihan,
Observing From the Wings, Wash. Post, June 4,1995 at Al (discussing Senator Moynihan's efforts to "get welfare recipients into the work force and to discourage out-ofwedlock births").
252. See Robert D. Reischauer, The Blockbuster Inside the Republicans' Budget: In
the Rush to FiscalDevolution, Has Anyone Figured Out How to Divvy Up the Cash,
Wash. Post, May 14, 1995 at C2 (stating that "out-of-wedlock births have soared").
253. See Mary McGrory, No LegitimateSolution in Sight, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1995
at A2 ("Social scientists project a 50 percent illegitimacy rate by the turn of the
century.").
254. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)). The idea that someone could be forced to abort because she was not married
would offend people across the political spectrum Policies that might induce (much
less require) abortions have sparked protest. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, Welfare
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one.255 Thus, marriage is neither a logical nor a legal predicate either
of having or of raising a child. Zablocki cannot plausibly be understood to be as limited as the Baehr plurality implied-indeed, it has
been suggested that Zablocki is 2much
more significant than many
6
lower courts are willing to admit. 5
In most states, gay or lesbian individuals can adopt children or can
have custody of their own biological children.257 Some commentators
suggest that preventing gay and lesbian people from having custody of
children would be unconstitutional, 2 8 especially considering that empirical studies indicate that children raised by lesbian or gay parents
are no more likely to have emotional or psychological disorders than
are children raised by heterosexual parents. 259
The constitutionality of laws limiting gay and lesbian parenting is
not at issue here. What is at issue is an interpretation of Supreme
Court precedents regarding who may marry whom. The Baehr plurality offered an interpretation of the relevant precedents that both ignores the case law and defies common sense. That the court's
interpretation was in error becomes even more obvious when one
Overhaul Survives Abortion Dispute: Disincentive for Childbearing Spurs 15 From
GOP to Defect on House ProceduralRule, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1995 at A12 (stating
that some conservative lawmakers "were concerned that pregnant unmarried teenagers and older welfare mothers would have abortions rather than face proposed cuts in
benefits").
255. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 144 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he very premise of Stanley and
the cases following it is that marriage is not decisive in answering the question
whether the Constitution protects the parental relationship under consideration.").
256. See Karst, supra note 87, at 671 ("Properly understood, Zablocki implies a
thoroughgoing reassessment of the constitutionality of a wide range of state laws limiting the right to marry and restricting other nonmarital forms of intimate
association.").
257. Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443, 1528
("Today most states consider a parent's sexual behavior relevant to determining custody only if the behavior directly affects the parent's relationship with the child.").
258. Beschle, supra note 65, at 89-90; cf.Strasser, supra note 23, at 1026 ("Homosexuals do not merely invoke their right to marry. They also invoke their rights to
have and raise children."). But see In re Petition for Approval of Forms Pursuant to
Rule 10-1.1(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Stepparent Adoption
Forms, 613 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. 1992) ("A homosexual may not adopt in Florida.");
Law, supra note 83, at 231 ("[G]ay couples are often denied the ability to nurture
children as adoptive or foster parents.").
259. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to
Social Science Research, 1 Law & Sexuality 133, 157 (1991) ("[N]o evidence exists that
having a gay parent or role model is harmful to the child. Nor do the children of gay
parents differ significantly from children raised in heterosexual households in their
development of gender identity or sexual orientation." (footnote omitted)); Julienne
C. Scocca, Comment, Society's Ban on Same-Sex Marriages: A Reevaluation of the
So-Called "Fundamental Right" of Marriage, 2 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 719, 766-67
(1992) ("Research... show[s] that a parent's homosexual orientation does not result
in the child's developing an 'abnormal' gender identity. Likewise, research has revealed no statistical difference in the psychopathology of children raised in gay and
lesbian homes and children raised in heterosexual homes." (footnotes omitted)).
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considers other implications of the opinion. Not only is marriage
neither a logical nor a legal predicate of parenthood, but the contrapositive is also true-actual or potential parenthood is neither a
logical nor a legal predicate of marriage. Nonetheless, courts have
upheld state refusals to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples
because of their alleged inability to have children.' °
2. Marriage Without Procreation
Arguably, because the purpose of marriage is to provide a setting
for children, individuals (such as gays and lesbians) who cannot have
children need not be afforded the right to marry. This argument, however, is faulty because (1) there is no requirement that married
couples be able or willing to have children,2 61 and (2) even were there
such a requirement, gay and lesbian couples nonetheless could not be
precluded on that account. 262
It is obvious that there is no procreational requirement for marriage, because opposite-sex couples who will not or cannot procreate
may nonetheless marry. Courts only claim that "propagation of the
race is basic to the concept of marriage and its legal attributes" 263 and
use that to prevent couples from marrying when same-sex partners
wish to be joined together in matrimony. Yet, no unbiased court
would hold that opposite-sex couples unable to procreate are permitted to marry but that same-sex couples are prohibited from marrying
precisely because of their alleged inability to procreate. While there
may be justifications for distinguishing between opposite-sex and
same-sex couples, those justifications should be stated. Courts lose
credibility when they impose requirements on one group but not on
another when the two groups are similarly situated6 4
The Adams court tried to explain why there were no equal protection issues implicated by a policy that distinguished among couples
260. See infra notes 261-89 and accompanying text.
261. Hohengarten, supra note 49, at 1523 ("The ability to procreate is not and
never has been essential for entering into a marriage.").
262. Christopher J. Keller, Comment, Divining the Priest: A Case Comment on
Baehr v. Lewin, 12 Law & Ineq. J. 483,499 (1994) ("[Hjomosexual couples are falsely
assumed incapable of producing children through methods such as sperm donation,
egg donation, and surrogate mothers. Homosexual couples can propagate and help
'sustain the race.' "); Trosino, supra note 23, at 108 ("[E]ven if marriage, as an institution, is primarily concerned with child rearing, evidence suggests that gay couples
make suitable parents." (footnote omitted)); cf. Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This
Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homoserual Marriage,97 Yale LJ.
1783, 1790 (1988) ("Though the lack of connection at first blush appears 'natural,' for
by their sexual union homosexuals cannot procreate, the Court failed to acknowledge
that only state prohibitions-legal constructs-bar homosexuals from marrying and
raising families.").
263. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).

264. Link, supra note 211, at 1078 ("We use lack of procreative ability against gay
men and lesbians in a way we do not use it against heterosexuals.").
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unable to procreate, allowing the opposite-sex couples to marry but
prohibiting the same-sex couples from doing so. The court reasoned
that because "the state has a compelling interest in encouraging and
fostering procreation of the race and providing status and stability to
the environment in which children are raised,"265 the state is permit' 266
ted "to allow legal marriage as between all couples of opposite sex,
even though some of those couples will be unable to have children.
The court understood that there were other ways the state might seek
to promote its compelling interest in procreation. For example, the
state could "inquire of each couple, before issuing a marriage license,
as to their plans for children."2 6 ' Further, the state might "give sterility tests to all applicants, refusing licenses to those found sterile or
unwilling to raise a family. '268 The court rejected this approach, believing that "[s]uch tests and inquiries would themselves raise serious
constitutional questions. 269
Yet, one must wonder why these policies would be constitutionally
offensive if indeed the state has a compelling interest in making sure
that only people willing and able to procreate are joined in matrimony. The state would be narrowly tailoring its procedures to promote its compelling interest.
The Adams court failed to notice that even more constitutional issues are raised by the state's allegedly having a compelling interest in
procreation but only seeking to promote that interest at the expense
of one particular group.2 7 ° Theorists mirror this tendency of selectively applying theories to the disadvantage of one particular group
when they claim that the purpose of sexual relations is to produce
offspring but then make an exception for sterile, heterosexual
couples.2 71 At the very least,
these thinkers are open to the charge of
272
intellectual inconsistency.
Even if the sole purpose of marriage is to provide a setting for the
production and raising of children, constitutional questions are raised
by inquiring about couples' procreational abilities if the state does not
265.
266.
267.
268.

Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1124.
Id- (emphasis added).
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1124-25.

269. ld. at 1125 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).

270. See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
271. See John M. F'mnis, Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation," 69 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1049, 1066 (1994); cf. David AJ. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitu-

tion, 30 Hastings LJ. 957, 976 (1979) ("[A]ccording to one influential model, sex is
only proper for the purpose of procreation.").
272. Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of

Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1515, 1529
(1994) (suggesting that the permissibility of unwillingly sterile couples' engaging in
sexual relations "raises some deep questions about the consistency of [Finis's]
reasoning").
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in fact have a compelling interest in preventing individuals from marrying who are incapable of producing children through their union r
After all, such a couple might adopt a child or one of the individuals
might have a child.274 In either of these scenarios, the court would
need a different justification for upholding the state prohibition of
that marriage.
The Adams court may have believed that asking individuals about
their procreational plans would itself invade their privacy-if the
court could know those plans without asking, then no privacy issues
would be implicated. Yet, there is no basis in law for such a position.
A man and a woman who voluntarily signed an affidavit stating that
each had been sterilized could not be prevented from marrying on
that ground and, presumably, not even the Adams court would have
upheld a statute that prevented two such people from marrying z s
The point here is not that couples unable or unwilling to procreate
should not be allowed to marry if gay and lesbian couples cannot"the fact that a State is dealing with a distinct class and treats the
' Z76
members of that class equally does not end the judicial inquiry."
There is no reason that nonprocreating couples should be prevented
from marrying and thus no reason that the whole class should have
that burden placed upon it. But additional difficulties are raised when
a group is selectively burdened. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,277 the Court
points out that "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow... officials to pick and choose only a few to whom
they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
278
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected."
The Singer court reasoned that because "marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated
with the propagation of the human race," 279 and because "it is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union,"'" 0 the state's refusal to authorize same-sex
273. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
274. See Hohengarten, supra note 49, at 1520 ("An individual involved in a same-

sex relationship may be a biological parent (perhaps, but not necessarily, as a result of

a previous marriage to someone of the opposite sex), and the same-sex partner of this
biological parent may serve as the functional second parent to a child raised within
the context of their relationship.").
275. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 1011-12 (suggesting that a law prohibiting those
past childbearing or childbegetting age from marrying would be declared
unconstitutional).
276. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965).

277. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
278. 1& at 454 (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,
497 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It cannot be true that the validity of a total ban is
an adequate justification for a selective prohibition; otherwise, the constitutional objection to discriminatory rules would be meaningless.").
279. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. CL App. 1974).
280. i
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marriage does not involve "invidious discrimination. '28 ' The court
recognized that "married couples are not required to become parents
and ... some couples are incapable of becoming parents and.., not
2 2
all couples who produce children are married."
'283 ' It claimed, however, that these were "exceptional situations.
The Singer court's analysis was faulty on both empirical and conceptual grounds. First, there is reason to think that the Singer court's
demographic analysis was inaccurate at the time 284 and is even less
accurate now. 28 5 It was not and is not true that only the exceptional
married couple does not have children. Even were such a demographic analysis accurate, however, the court's opinion would still
have been unpersuasive. Presumably, "societal values associated with
the propagation of the human race '286 also involve the nurturing and
raising of children. Thus, same-sex couples who have children fall
within the protected category rather than outside of it. 287 When the
Adams court argued that "the state has a compelling interest in ...
providing status and stability to the environment in which children are
raised," 288 it conveniently overlooked that its argument supported
rather than undermined allowing same-sex couples to marry, precisely
because such couples may have children to raise. 28 9 Both the Adams
and Singer courts paradoxically asserted that the state's compelling
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Randolph E. Schmid, Working Mom Is Now U.S. Norm, Detroit Free
Press, June 16, 1988, at 8B ("The number of childless couples with both husband and
wife employed and the wife of childbearing age increased from 3 million to 4.3 million
over the 11-year period [1976-1987]."). The 4.3 million couples only involve a subset
of all of the married, childless couples, because some couples might not have been of
childbearing age and others might not have had both individuals working outside of
the home.
285. See Tom Walker, "Career Survival Kit" Offers Tips for Worried Workers, Atlanta Const., Oct. 3, 1991, at B3 ("The share of U.S. households represented by twoparent families with children shrank 13 percent from 1970 to 1990.").
286. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
287. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 1026 ("Even were homosexuals unable to procreate at all, their adopting and raising children would help to promote the survival of
the race, since they would be providing a stable and nurturing home for individuals
who will eventually be contributing members of society.").
288. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
289. Eskridge, supra note 88, at 364 ("[M]any bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians have
children."); Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy:
Abandoning Scriptural, Canonica and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage,
35 How. L.J. 173, 207 (1992) ("The 'procreation' argument ignores the fact that homosexual couples are having and raising children .... ."); Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and
Gay Families and the Law: A ProgressReport, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 927, 941 (1994)
("[E]xcluding same-sex couples from marriage is not necessary to achieve the state's
interest, and may be counterproductive in light of the many same-sex couples who are
raising children and for whom obtaining the benefits of marriage will assist their children in the same way that those benefits assist the children of opposite-sex couples.
.. "); Bowman & Cornish, supra note 35, at 1181-82 ("Many children live in house-
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interest in providing a stable environment for the raising of children
justified denying marital status to individuals who did have children to
raise and granting marital status to individuals who did not. Opinions
like these undermine the belief that the courts are approaching the
same-sex marriage issue fairly and in good faith.
The state's compelling interest in providing a stable home for the
raising of children is a reason to allow rather than prohibit same-sex
marriage. To use it as a reason to prohibit such unions is to turn the
rationale on its head. Indeed, even if one arbitrarily limited the state's
interest to the production of children, the argument still could not be
used in good faith to prohibit same-sex marriages. The state's refusal
to allow same-sex couples to marry might deter gay and lesbian individuals from procreating,precisely because they are barred from marrying.290 Neither the state nor the courts can in good faith use the
state's compelling interest in the production or raising of children as a
reason to prohibit lesbian and gay couples from marrying when such
couples both have and raise children.
The use of the argument that the state's compelling interest in producing and raising children justifies prohibiting certain marriages has
a sad and embarrassing history. It has been used to establish the invalidity of interracial marriages, either because such unions allegedly
will produce offspring who may not be able to reproduce with their
chosen mates 91 or because, in any case, the offspring of interracial
marriages are allegedly inferior.2 " This history alone should give
holds headed by other than a married couple, and measures to enhance the stability of
such households would protect and promote children's welfare.").
290. See Developments, supra note 81, at 1610 ("The prohibition on same-sex marriage may in fact discourage procreation; some same-sex couples may elect not to
have children precisely because their relationship is not sanctioned by the state.").
291. See State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) ("It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a
black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny, and such a fact
sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and whites,
laying out of view other sufficient grounds for such enactments."); see also Alfred
Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The OriginalIntent,
52 Va. L. Rev. 1224,1239 (1966) ("Senator James R. Doolittle ... claimed that mulattoes could not propagate their species indefinitely, and concluded: 'It is the fiat of the
Almighty which is stamped upon this very idea of forcing an amalgamation of the
races against nature and against the laws of God.' "); Trosino, supra note 23, at 101-02
("A common belief held by white Southerners was 'that mulattoes cannot reproduce
amongst themselves after the third generation and that they are troublesome by nature while unmixed blacks just naturally "know their place."'
292. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749,756 (Va.) ("We find.., no requirement that
the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial pride, but must permit
the corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship."), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 350 U.S. 891 (1955); Trosino, supra note 23, at
101 ("Another justification for anti-miscegenation laws was based on the popular belief that children of interracial marriage were mentally and physically inferior to pure
race children.").
').

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

courts reason to pause before asserting such a rationale, especially because a related rationale was rejected in Loving.293
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,2 94 the Court held that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." 295 Yet, there is no reason to think that the very existence and
survival of the human race should or will rest on the shoulders only of
those whose biological parents raise them.
When the Court has discussed the fundamental right to raise one's
children, the Court has not limited that right only to those parents
who were raising their own biological children.296 Thus, even had the
Supreme Court "deemed marriage a fundamental right substantially
because of its relationship to procreation, '' 297 marriage would still be
fundamental for gays and lesbians who are also raising children needing a stable and loving environment.29 It is thus difficult to understand how judges who "recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and
do have children through adoption, surrogacy, and artificial insemination ' 299 can nonetheless believe that such families do not warrant constitutional protection.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,30 0 the Supreme Court struck
down housing restrictions that were based on an overly narrow definition of family.3 ' Were courts correct that the Supreme Court's domestic relations jurisprudence is based on the model of two parents

who raise their own biological children, Moore would have been decided differently. When the Moore Court noted that it "is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural, ' ' 30 2 the Court could not have been limiting
293. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) ("[T]he State argues, the scientific
evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the
wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial
marriages.").
294. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
295. Id. at 541.

296. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (holding that
parents and guardians have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children and the children for whom they are responsible); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (holding that the guarantee of liberty in the 14th Amendment is "not
merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to... marry,
establish a home and bring up children").
297. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. See id. at 345 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
between eight and ten million children are raised in gay and lesbian households).
299. Id. at 333; see also Nussbaum, supra note 272, at 1650 ("Many same-sex
couples ... have and raise children, whether their own from previous relationships,
adopted, or engendered by artificial insemination within the same-sex relationship.").
300. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
301. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 555 (12th ed. 1991) ("Moore invalidated a zoning ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling to members of a single

'family,' narrowly defined .... ).
302. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
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its discussion of the family to two parents who were raising children
biologically related to both of them? 3° 3 Rather, the Supreme Court
has recognized what the lower courts discussed here apparently have
not, namely, that many of our most cherished values are passed down
in settings that do not involve two parents raising children biologically
related to each of them.
The Moore Court cautioned that "when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation."'3 1 Apparently, various lower courts have not taken that
warning to heart.
The Moore Court made clear that courts must not close their "eyes
to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have
been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

30 5

As the Roberts Court emphasized, families "have

played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs."' 3 6 All kinds of
families may play that role, not just those in which the children are
biologically related to both adults.
Perhaps the difficulty is not that gay and lesbian parents will be
unable to communicate values to their children, but that they will
communicate the "wrong" values.3° Yet, there is no reason to believe
that the "wrong" values would be transmitted-commitment, loyalty,
tolerance, and respect for self and others are values that should be
transmitted. 30 8 Further, there is no one set of values exhausting the
"permissible" values that may be imparted.3' 9 Finally, were the relevant standard for raising children whether the "wrong" values would
be imparted, many parents teaching their children intolerance of, for
example, other races, nationalities, or religions, would seem vulnerable to losing their children.310
303. See Gunther, supra note 301, at 555 & n.7 (pointing out that the statute at
issue would not have been violated were the grandmother living with two grandsons
who were brothers rather than first cousins).
304. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
305. Id.at 501.
306. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
307. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972) ("A way of life that is odd
or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.").

308. See Heeb, supra note 103, at 354-55.
309. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the
State, 107 Harv.L. Rev. 1348, 1371 (1994) ("People are not meant to be socialized to
uniform, externally imposed values. People are to be able to form families and other
intimate communities within which children might be differently socialized and from
which adults would bring different values to the democratic process.").
310. Cf.Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, I., dissenting)
("We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one,
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The Zablocki Court recognized the right to marry as fundamental
because it is the "foundation of the family in our society. ' '311 Families,
however, need not and often do not involve children. Marriage and
family serve a variety of important functions in addition to the production and raising of children.
Were one to read the court opinions that suggest that same-sex relationships are not afforded constitutional protection, one would infer
that the sole reason that marriage is important is that it facilitates the
begetting and raising of the couple's own biological children. This
analysis, which makes marriage only instrumentally important for the
production and rearing of children, misrepresents the nature of the
interest in marriage. The right to marry is itself "of fundamental importance, ''312 just as the right to procreate is itself fundamental,
whether the procreator is married or single.3 13 Further, the Supreme
Court has never said that only heterosexuals have a fundamental interest in marriage; on the contrary, "the
right to marry is of funda'314
mental importance for all individuals.
3. Intimate Association
In Board of Directorsof Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte,31 5 the Court recognized that "the freedom to enter into and carry
on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element
of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. ' 316 The Court discussed a
number of intimate associations that are protected: marriage, begetting and bearing children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with relatives.3 1 7 The Court explicitly rejected the argument that
only those relationships that
implicate all of these intimate associa318
tions would be protected.
In Turner v. Safley,31 9 the Supreme Court had to decide whether
prisoners have a right to marry while they are in prison. The Court
recognized that the "right to marry, like many other rights, is subject
to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. 3 10 Thus, a rein which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellent
practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies.").
311. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
312. Id. at 383.
313. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
314. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
315. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
316. Id- at 545.
317. Id.
318. Id. ("Of course, we have not held that constitutional protection is restricted to
relationships among family members.").
319. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
320. Id. at 95.
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striction that might not pass constitutional muster outside of the
prison context might be permissible within that context. Nonetheless,
"legitimate corrections goals ' 32 ' notwithstanding, the Court recognized that3 the prisoner's right to marry was constitutionally
protected. 11
Turner is important because of the interests that the Court recognized as having constitutional significance. The Court upheld the prisoner's right to marry because (1) marriages "are expressions of
emotional support and public commitment"; 3 (2) marriage may involve "an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication"; 3" (3) most marriages will be "formed in the
expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated"; - and
(4) marriage is often a "precondition to the receipt of government
benefits." 326
The Court did not say that the fundamental interest in marriage was
dependent upon the couple's having or raising children. Indeed, the
Court did not say that marriage was dependent upon consummation,
because most rather than all marriages would be formed in the expectation of their being consummated. 32 7 Instead, the Court mentioned
interests possessed by all individuals, including gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals. 3' If the interests articulated by the Court justify allowing
opposite-sex couples to marry, legitimate penological concerns
notwithstanding, it is hard to understand why those same individual
interests are suddenly insufficiently weighty to allow same-sex couples
to marry, even when no penological concerns are implicated.
Ironically, it was brought to the attention of the Dean court that
Turner involved factors that applied to both same-sex and oppositesex couples.329 Nonetheless, the Dean court rejected the approach of321. Id.at 96.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 95.
324. Id. at 96.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. But see Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay MarriageDebate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 Law & Sexuality 63, 87 (1991).
Dunlap writes:

The buried premise of most discussions of marriage, that marriage must involve sex, should be unearthed and, insofar as government is concerned, rejected. If it is not the business of government to regulate private adult
consenting sexual activity in general, why should government be free to prescribe it, implicitly or otherwise, as a requisite of marriage?
Id.
328. Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution Toward a Synthesis for
"Earthbound"Interpreters,61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 29, 46 (1992) ("IHlomosexual relationships embody many of the same goods as heterosexual relationships: friendship, care,
affection, intimate society. All of these goods and more are promoted through homosexual as well as heterosexual relationships.").
329. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 336 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Appellants proffer that, given the nature
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fered by the Supreme Court and instead seemed to accept the Baehr
analysis linking marriage to procreation, 330 and then failed to recognize that the state's procreation concerns support allowing same-sex
couples to marry.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,3 3 ' the Court recognized that "individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others. 332 These relationships must be protected "from unwarranted state interference, 333 at least in part, because they safeguard
"the ability.., to define one's identity" 334 independently. The ability
'335
to develop one's own identity is "central to any concept of liberty.
The Roberts Court recognized that intimate associations "foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the State.

' 336

Such relationships safeguard "the individual freedom

that is central to our constitutional scheme. 3 37 Insofar as intimate
associations serve as a buffer between individuals and the state so that
individuals can independently define themselves, gay and lesbian intimate associations are especially deserving of protection, 338 because

of homosexuality, Turner's attributes of marriage-emotional support, religious or
spiritual significance, physical consummation, and government and other benefitsare as relevant and important to same-sex couples as to heterosexual couples.").
330. See id. at 332 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("An historical survey of Supreme Court cases concerning the fundamental right to marry,
however, demonstrates that the Court has called this right 'fundamental' because of
its link to procreation." (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55 (Haw.) (plurality opinion), reconsiderationgranted in part,875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993)).
331. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
332. Id. at 619.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) ("At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.").
336. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. Dissenting from the Court's holding in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Justice Blackmun argued that:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as
ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships,
and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom
an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.
Id.at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
337. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
338. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 863 (N.D. Ga. 1993) ("[T]he court
finds as a matter of law that plaintiff's relationship with her female partner constitutes
a constitutionally-protected intimate association."); see also Developments, supra note
81, at 1606 ("Choice in intimate relationships is no less critical for homosexuals than
for heterosexuals.").
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unconventional associations are the most likely to be subject to
discrimination.339
Several commentators have suggested that the right to same-sex
marriage should be recognized as falling within the right to intimate
association. 3 ° Insofar as marriage is protected because it involves an
intimate lifelong commitment that may be central to the life of any
individual, both opposite-sex and same-sex unions must be
protected.341
Same-sex couples seeking the right to marry are not merely seeking
the right to live together, but to live together as a unit recognized by
society. It is simply false that the fundamental interest in intimate
association is satisfied as long as the individuals may live in the same
household.Z Just as a state refusal to recognize interracial or interreligious marriages would not be upheld on grounds that the state was
willing to allow such couples to live together, the state cannot escape
its responsibility to recognize same-sex marriages by allowing intrasexual couples to live together.
In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,3M3 the Court discussed matters that
involved "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
339. Karst, supra note 87, at 664 ("[ln the area of intimate association... the
unconventional are the most likely victims of legislative discrimination."); see also
Michael L v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In a
community such as ours, 'liberty' must include the freedom not to conform."); Coates
v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (discussing "discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is 'annoying' because their ideas, their
lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow
citizens").
340. Epstein, supra note 177, at 2460 ("[T]he current prohibitions against same-sex
marriages are themselves a mistake-regardless of what one thinks of the wisdom or
morality of these marriages-and should be rejected as inimical to the basic principle
of freedom of association on which a liberal society should rest."); see also David AJ.
Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L Rev.
800, 853 (1986) (arguing that a basic principle of equal rights is that they "must be
fairly extended to the most despised minorities"); Catherine E. Blackburn, Comment,
Human Rights in an InternationalContex. Recognizing the Right of Intimate Association, 43 Ohio St. LU. 143, 163 (1982) ("It remains for the Supreme Court of the
United States... to recognize expressly the right of all citizens of the United States to
be free to associate in intimate relationships without unwarranted governmental
intrusion.").
341. Catherine M. Cullem, Note, Fundamental Interests and the Question of SameSex Marriage,15 Tulsa L-. 141, 142 (1979) ("Ilt is the intimate, lifelong commitment
between two people which gives the marital relationship its special and protected status."); Developments, supra note 81, at 1608 ("To the extent that marriage is a vehicle
for stability because of the commitment it embodies, gay men and lesbians in stable,
committed relationships should be no less entitled to marry than their heterosexual
counterparts.").
342. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this point. See Beschle, supra
note 65, at 89 ("[C]onsider a legislative decision to formally recognize only heterosexual unions as 'marriages.' This act does not unduly burden the liberty of homosexuals
to live as couples, so it would be subject only to the rational basis test.").

343. 112 S. Ct 2791 (1992).
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in a lifetime." 3" The Court explained that "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. ' 345 It is hard to imagine those choices that
qualify as central to personal dignity and autonomy if one's choice of
an intimate life partner does not.
The freedom of intimate association is not absolute. The Government can regulate such relationships to promote very important interests. 34 6 Those interests must be real, however-they cannot suddenly
be compelling so that discrimination against gays and lesbians can be
justified, and just as suddenly be noncompelling when nongay and
nonlesbian individuals seek benefits seemingly precluded by these
same, formerly compelling, state interests.
The Loving Court described marriage as "one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness."' 34 7 Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that "the very idea that
one man may be compelled to hold ...any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself. '348 Courts that permit legislatures to prohibit individuals from marrying their same-sex partners are acting as accomplices in
perpetuating this intolerable situation.
C. What the Right to Marry Includes
Even were courts to recognize all of the interests that the institution
of marriage serves, it would not follow that no restrictions on marriage would be permissible. The Zablocki Court recognized that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." 349
The Court also recognized, however, that "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right,
it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important
state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.* 350 This implies that a statutory classification significantly inter351

fering with the right to marry must serve compelling state interests.

344. Id at 2807 (plurality opinion).
345. 1& (plurality opinion).
346. Karst, supra note 87, at 627 ("The freedom of intimate association, like other
constitutional freedoms, is presumptive rather than absolute... [and] may give way
to overriding governmental interests.").
347. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).

348.
349.
350.
351.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
Id. at 388.
See id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Arguably, the Court's close scrutinization of any state marital restriction would result in its being invalidated. 352 Yet, if that is true,
then the state restrictions on bigamy and incest, for example, must not
be serving important state interests and arguably should be
invalidated. 53
Justice Douglas suggested that the state prohibition of bigamy wAll
eventually be ruled constitutionally infirm. 354 At least thus far, however, his prediction has not come true. Courts have subjected the classification to strict scrutiny and have nonetheless upheld it.3 5
Incest regulations might also seem vulnerable if subjected to strict
scrutiny.356 Yet, there may be sufficiently compelling reasons to justify such prohibitions, e.g., genetic concerns 357 or the protection of the
young.358 Insofar as those interests are not implicated or are not
deemed sufficiently important, 359 and insofar as there are no other important interests served by the prohibition, 360 then perhaps such regu352. See id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A 'compelling state
purpose' inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have
fashioned to govern marriage and divorce.").
353. Iilton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A Comment on Social Constructionism,79 Va. L. Rev. 1515, 1525 (1993) ("One can easily argue, then,
that incest statutes are a crude form of regulation that sweeps both too broadly and
too narrowly.. ").
354. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Yoder decision would eventuate an overruling of Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which upheld the state prohibition of polygamy); see also
Beschle, supra note 65, at 82 (suggesting "that the polygamy cases were wrongly
decided").
355. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.) ("[T]he State is justified,
by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to
protect the monogamous marriage relationship."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985);
see also Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360, 1366-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the state has a compelling interest in maintaining monogamous marriage qualification for its peace officers).
356. See State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 177 (1883) (suggesting that recognizing a
federal constitutional right to marry would undermine incest laws).
357. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 313 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing genetic concerns raised by incest);
see also In re Estate of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156, 158 (Kan. 1981) (discussing reasons
for preventing incestuous marriages).
358. Bowman & Cornish, supra note 35, at 1182 ("[T]he potential for exploitation
in a marriage between an adult and a child would be very high.").
359. It is not clear, for example, that the state's genetic interest, even if legitimate,
is of sufficient weight to warrant a marriage prohibition. Cf. Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d
506, 510 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) (suggesting that incestuous relationship between uncle and niece "may be treated not as biologically harmful but only as sociologically improper").
360. See Karst, supra note 87, at 672 ("[Ilncest laws forbidding parent-child marriage are arguably sustainable even when the child is mature, on the theory that parental authority established during one's childhood may have a lasting impact,
dominating what would otherwise be the child's freedom of choice."); Bowman &
Cornish, supra note 35, at 1182-83 (qhe prohibition on incest ... may find support in
a concern for promoting social integration by encouraging marriage across family
lines and by a concern for preserving nonsexual intimacy within the family."); Keller,
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lations should not be upheld.161 Indeed, where genetic concerns are
not at issue and where the individuals are of age, there has been a
tendency to relax incest prohibitions. 363 For example, a man was al363 and a brother was allowed to
lowed to marry his adopted daughter,
364
marry his sister by adoption.
Regulations preventing minors from marrying have been upheld as
promoting important state interests, 365 although they have not been
subjected to strict scrutiny.3 66 Such regulations are less vulnerable to
attack both because they concern minors who are less capable of making a mature, informed decision and because the regulation would defer rather than prohibit marriage. 67
The Supreme Court has held that reasonable regulations that
merely defer marriage may pass constitutional muster. For example,
when upholding residency requirements for divorce, 368 the Court
made clear that such requirements were permissible because they did
not involve a "total deprivation ' 369 of the right to marry but "only [a]
delay. ' 370 It should be noted that the prohibition of same-sex marriage involves
a total denial of the right to marry rather than a mere
371
delay.
supra note 262, at 506 ("It is the potential for domination and exploitation in incestuous relationships which undermines consent to the extent that the value of the liberty
interest is grossly outweighed by its potential for harm.").
361. Cf Martha L. Fneman, Law and Changing Patternsof Behavior: Sanctions on
Non-Marital Cohabitation,1981 Wis. L. Rev. 275, 315. Fineman writes:

It is hard to distinguish under a privacy analysis a choice to engage in bigamy, polygamy or a homosexual marriage from a choice to cohabit. If there
are constitutionally protected associational values in intimate relationships,

they permeate all forms of such relationships, not only those which resemble
the traditional, heterosexual, monogamous marriage.
Id.
362. Singer, supra note 257, at 1466 ("Several recent cases have held that statutory
prohibitions against incestuous marriage do not apply to relationships created by
adoption.").
363. Bagnardi v. Hartnett, 366 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
364. Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (en banc).
365. Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).

366. See id. ("[T]he right of minors to marry has not been viewed as a fundamental
right deserving strict scrutiny.").
367. See Karst, supra note 87, at 672 ("Age restrictions, for example, can be seen as

promoting the principle of associational choice, when the age of autonomy is set low
enough. The choice to marry requires not only intellectual capacity but the maturity
to appreciate something of the nature of the commitment one is making."); Bowman
& Cornish, supra note 35, at 1182 ("Children cannot be expected to be capable of
making informed decisions about marriage ...
368. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
369. Id. at 410.
370. Id
371. Friedman, supra note 289, at 199 ("Legal prohibitions against same-sex mar-

riages.., wholly proscribe the ability of individuals to enter marriage with a partner
of their choice.").
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The point here is not that the state has (or does not have) an impor-

tant interest in prohibiting bigamous or incestuous marriages, but
merely that statutory classifications that significantly infringe on the
fundamental right to marry must promote important or compelling
interests if they are to be upheld. If the state is going to prohibit
same-sex marriage, it must articulate the important state interests that
would thereby be served.
D. Anti-miscegenation Laws
There are numerous reasons why the best analogue to the current
state refusal to recognize intrasexual marriages is the former state refusal to recognize interracial marriages. 3 2 Many of the same reasons
justifying the Court's striking down anti-miscegenation statutes justify
striking down laws prohibiting same-sex marriages. 3 "
In the context of racial intermarriage, the Supreme Court of California in Perez v. Lippold7 4 pointed out that because "the right to
marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a
statute that prohibits an individual from marrying a member of a race
other than his own restricts the scope of his choice and thereby restricts his right to marry." 37 The court recognized the great burden
that individuals are forced to bear when laws prevent those individuals from marrying the person of their choice: "A member of any of
these races may find himself barred by law from marrying the person
of his choice and that person to him may be irreplaceable. Human
beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine that would make
them as interchangeable as trains.13 76 As one of the concurring judges
in Perez pointed out, the question was not whether many would
choose to marry someone of another race; rather, it was whether
those
n
"who do so desire have the right to make that choice."
It is of course correct that interracial and intrasexual marriages are
different. Thus, the Court's holding Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statute unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia378 did not thereby invali372. See generally Strasser, supra note 23 (discussing the parallels between prohibitions on interracial marriages and prohibitions on same-sex marriages).
373. See Ron-Christopher Stamps, Comment, Domestic Partnership Legislation:
Recognizing Non-TraditionalFamilies, 19 S.U. L Rev. 441, 446 (1992) (likening current obstacles preventing same-sex marriages to past obstacles preventing interracial
marriages).
374. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).

375. Id. at 19.
376. Id. at 25; see also Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia'sAnti-MiscegenationStatute in HistoricalPerspective,52 Va. L Rev. 1189, 1219 (1966) ("A miscegenation law may put an individual to a cruel choice between marrying the person
whom he loves and leaving his home, or denying his affections and remaining in the
state.").
377. Perez, 198 P.2d at 31 (Carter, J., concurring).
378. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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date all intrasexual marriage prohibitions.379 The rationale behind
Loving, however, implies that same-sex marriage bans will not pass
constitutional muster.
The Baker court suggested that "there is a clear distinction between
a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the
fundamental difference in sex."'38 ° Yet, such a view misrepresents just
how fundamental the difference in race was thought to be. At the
time the Virginia anti-miscegenation law was invalidated, many did
not think it obvious that the right to marry included the right to marry
someone of a different race.3 81 Interracial marriages were not envisioned as traditional marriages deserving the kinds of protections intraracial marriages deserved. 3s Indeed, interracial marriages were
described as violating God's Law. 3
E. A New Fundamental Right?

When the Baehr plurality addressed whether there was a due process right to same-sex marriage, the court sought to determine
whether such a union should be recognized as a new fundamental
right.384 Not surprisingly, it concluded that a right to same-sex marriage is not "so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of
our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions. '3 5 It also concluded that the right to same-sex
379. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 70 (Haw.) (Heen, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
plaintiff in Loving was not claiming a right to a same sex marriage."), reconsideration
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
380. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (emphasis added), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
381. See, e.g., Avins, supra note 291, at 1255. Avins writes:
I therefore am led to conclude that the fourteenth amendment does not forbid state laws preventing interracial marriage or extra-marital sexual relations. The matter remains subject to the state police power. Whatever the
fate, therefore, of these laws in the present United States Supreme Court,
the abiding Constitution of the United States, which I believe will ultimately
prevail, makes these anti-miscegenation laws completely valid.
Id.
382. Some commentators seem not to appreciate this. See Beschle, supra note 65, at
64 ("A 'right to marry' has been recognized, but that right has thus far been limited to
the right to be free of obstacles to entering a traditional marriage.").
383. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va.) (discussing with approval a case
holding that "the natural law which forbids their intermarriage and the social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races is as clearly divine as that which imparted
to them different natures"), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 350 U.S. 891 (1955); see
also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (discussing the trial court's view that God
did not intend such marriages).
384. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw.) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e are
being asked to recognize a new fundamental right."), reconsiderationgrantedin part,
875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
385. Id.; see also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that same-sex marriage is
not deeply rooted in this nation's history); Dean v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No.

1995]

SLUMBERING BAEHR

marriage is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed." 3s The
court failed to appreciate that same-sex marriages are not rooted in
the consciences of the people, at least in part, precisely because lesbians, bisexuals,387 and gays have historically been subjected to
discrimination.
The Baehr plurality's analysis was faulty in that it used the wrong
level of specificity when describing the right to marry. That error led
the plurality to believe that a new fundamental right was at issue
rather than a right already recognized. Further, when deciding
whether the "new" right should be recognized, the plurality used a
standard that would not have been met by many of the interests already included within the right to privacy. For example, had the
Supreme Court used the analogue of the Baehr analysis in Loving,
3
Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute would have been upheld. 88
In Bowers v. Hardwick,389 the Supreme Court wrote, "The Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in
the language or design of the Constitution." 39° Certainly, the Court
needs some standard by which to decide what the Due Process Clause
protects. Just as certainly, however, the Court must not arbitrarily
change its standards when judging what is protected.
One such standard has been proposed by Justice Scalia: A practice
"is not constitutionally protected... [if] (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed." 39' Such a
jurisprudence, however, would mean that contraception, abortion, and
90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *1-2 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992) (same), affd, 653
A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
386. Baehr,852 P.2d at 57 (plurality opinion); see also Michael K. Steenson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray" Area: The Right of Privacy Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 383, 422 (1994) ("The court's decision in Baehr
identifies the problems involved in asserting that the right to privacy encompasses a
right to same-sex marriage, even under a specific constitutional provision that governs
privacy. History and tradition typically present formidable hurdles for such arguments." (footnote omitted)).
387. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993) ("[H]omosexuality is not considered a deeply-rooted part of our traditions precisely because homosexuals have historically been subjected to invidious discrimination." (citation omitted)); see also Dean,
653 A.2d at 345 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he discrimination faced by homosexuals is plainly no less pernicious or intense than the discrimination faced by other groups already treated as suspect classes. .. ").
388. See Hohengarten, supra note 49, at 1509; Trosino, supra note 23, at 114.
389. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
390. Id at 194.
391. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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miscegenation would all be proscribable. Further, such a view entails
overturning a variety of precedents.
In Roe v. Wade,3 92 Justice Stewart pointed out, "The Constitution
nowhere mentions a specific right of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life. ' 39 3 Further, the Roe Court was well aware
that abortion had been criminalized by many states for about a century.3 94 According to Justice
Scalia's analysis, abortion does not fall
395
within the right to privacy.

The right to use contraception or, more generally, the right to procreate is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. 96 Further,
contraception has a history of being criminalized by the states. For
example, at the time that Griswold v. Connecticut3' was decided,
Connecticut had criminalized the use of contraception for over eighty
years.398 When Eisenstadt v. Baird399 was decided, Massachusetts had
criminalized the distribution of contraceptives for over ninety years.400
Applying Justice Scalia's test, the distribution or use of contraception
should not have been included within the right to privacy.
The right to marry someone of a different race is mentioned nowhere in the Constitution and, even more generally, the right to marry
is not explicitly protected in the Constitution.4 ° ' States had criminalized racial intermarriage for a very long time. 4° Were the Court to
have accepted Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, Loving would have had a
392. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
393. Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
394. Id. at 116 ("The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have
been in effect in many States for approximately a century.").
395. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2876 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Nor do the historical traditions of the American people support the view that the right to terminate one's pregnancy is 'fundamental.' ").
396. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the
right to procreate .. ").
397. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
398. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961) ("The Connecticut law prohibiting
the use of contraceptives has been on the State's books since 1879.").
399. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
400. See id at 447 ("Section 21 stems from Mass. Stat. 1879, c. 159, § 1, which prohibited, without exception, distribution of articles intended to be used as
contraceptives.").
401. See Richards, supra note 340, at 834.
402. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(noting that "[m]arriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial
marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century"); Avins, supra note 291, at
1224 ("These laws represent one of the oldest categories of legislation in this country,
antedating by a considerable period of time in some instances the American Revolution. Such laws were widespread on the books of the states during the Reconstruction
period and for a long time thereafter, and they still exist in many states today." (footnotes omitted)); Hohengarten, supra note 49, at 1506 (noting that "mixed-race marriages, particularly between blacks and whites, had long been legally forbidden").
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different result. Indeed, much that is protected within the right to privacy would not be protected.
Justice Scalia's jurisprudence has been described as "tempting,"40 3
but "inconsistent with our law."
The question then becomes what
jurisprudence should be used. If "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the
specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects," 5 another standard must be offered to determine what is included within the right to
privacy.
40 6
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the plurality described the "Constitution's written terms ' 40 7 as embodying "ideas and aspirations"' 40 in need of interpretation and elucidation. That interpretation can be successfully performed only if the
Court is willing to "accept [its] responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the [Constitution] in light of all of [the
Court's] precedents."
As the Casey plurality recognized, the interpretation process cannot simply be mechanistic, because the "adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in
interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which
by
410
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.1
This reasoned judgment will involve the Court's making decisions
about the appropriate level of abstraction when judging the constitutionality of state classifications. For example, the right to procreation
involves a more abstract level of generality than the right to use contraceptives. As a general matter, it should not be surprising that the
greater the specificity with which one describes a right at issue, the
less likely it is that the right will have historically received protection.
Thus, while "the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a
family" 411 have
historically been protected, the right to use contracep412
not.
has
tion
Justice Scalia's jurisprudence has been criticized both because it selectively relies on tradition 4 13 and because it examines issues with an
403. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (plurality opinion).
404. Id.(plurality opinion).
405. Id. (plurality opinion).
406. 112 S. CL 2791 (1992).
407. Id. at 2833 (plurality opinion).
408. Id. (plurality opinion).
409. Id. (plurality opinion).
410. Id. at 2806 (plurality opinion).
411. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
412. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 139 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that if the degree of specificity used in Michael H. had been used in Eisenstadt and Griswold, the results would have been much different).
413. Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is ironic that an approach so utterly
dependent on tradition is so indifferent to our precedents.").
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inappropriate level of specificity. 41 4 Both of these weaknesses under-

lie the due process approaches contained in both Baehr and Dean.41 5
The level of specificity chosen by these courts, if applied in other contexts, would have meant that privacy would not include rights to contraception, abortion, or interracial marriage. The Bowers Court's
warning that there should be "great resistance to... redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental

'4 16

should also be taken

to heart to prevent the Court's recategorizing as mere liberties those
rights previously considered fundamental.
F. Sodomy
Some commentators suggest that the Court's upholding states'
rights to criminalize sodomy has important implications for same-sex
marriage.417 That may be correct, although not for the reasons usually
thought.
In Bowers, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that "proscriptions
against sodomy have very 'ancient roots.' ",418 Regrettably, he neglected to mention that proscriptions having ancient roots may not
have corresponded to what was proscribed by the state of Georgia.
For example, at common
law, oral sex was not included within the
4 19
crime of sodomy.

A general difficulty with the Bowers analysis is that while the Court
only addressed whether the "Federal Constitution confers a funda414. See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (characterizing Scalia's approach as "inconsistent with our past decisions in this area" because "[o]n occasion
the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of
generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available").
415. See, e.g., Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex Marriage,10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum.
Rts. 555, 582 (1993) (criticizing the Baehr court for mischaracterizing the right in
question).
416. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
417. Friedman, supra note 289, at 214 ("The decision in Bowers v. Hardwick upholding state statutes prohibiting homosexual sodomy deals a serious, if not fatal,
blow to any arguments that state prohibitions against same-sex marriages are unconstitutional."); Mary F. Gardner, Note, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.: Much Ado about
Nothing?, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 361, 363 (1990) ("[I]n many states, the recognition of a right
to same-sex marriage would conflict with state laws that criminalize consensual
sodomy.").
418. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
419. Rex v. Samuel Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (1817); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1125 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("[F]or a period of 83 years, oral sodomy was not illegal
in Texas-whether committed by man and wife, by unmarried male and female, or by
homosexuals."), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289, (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Ky. 1993) ("Unlike the present statute our common law tradition punished neither oral copulation nor any form of deviate sexual activity between women." (emphasis omitted)); Norman Vieira, Hardwick
and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1184 (1988) ("In Rex v Samuel
Jacobs. ... the court specifically held that the criminal prohibition against sodomy did
not apply to oral sex.").
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mental right... to engage in sodomy," 4 the Georgia statute proscribed sodomy whether committed intrasexually or intersexually. 21
Commentators who suggest that Bowers precludes same-sex marriage
seem to forget the Court's limited focus. 4 States can criminalize sodomy between unmarried heterosexuals without thereby implying that
sodomy between married heterosexuals is also precluded. 4 3 Likewise, states can criminalize sodomy between unmarried homosexuals
without implying that sodomy between married homosexuals is so
precluded. 42 4
Indeed, the case for the Federal Constitution's protecting same-sex
marriage may be stronger than for its protecting extramarital sodomy.425 Certainly, the Court could not in good faith echo its Bowers
decision by claiming that there is "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand'" 42 and same-sex unions on
the other. Insofar as sexual activity is protected because it instrumentally promotes the fundamental interest in marriage and family, samesex marriage may have to be recognized as a fundamental
right before
42 7
sodomy can be included within the right to privacy.
420. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
421. See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("It is important to note that, at present, it has not been established that anyone, heterosexual or
homosexual, has a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. The United States
Supreme Court has never held that heterosexuals have a fundamental right to engage
in sodomy."), rev'd in par4 vacated in part,895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (RI. 1980) (holding that unmarried persons committing sodomy are
unprotected); State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that sodomy
outside of marriage is not protected), review denied, appeal dismissed, 259 S.E.2d 304
(N.C. 1979), appealdismissed sub nom. Poe v. North Carolina, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
422. See supra note 417.
423. Poe, 252 S.E.2d at 845 ("IT]he state, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, can classify unmarried persons so as to prohibit fellatio between males and
females without forbidding the same acts between married couples."); State v. Santos,
413 A.2d 58, 68 (RI. 1980) ("[We hold that the right of privacy is inapplicable to the
private unnatural copulation between unmarried adults." (emphasis added)).
424. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 343 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Cullem, supra note 341, at 159-60
("It is not that sodomy is any less a crime or unnatural simply because it is undertaken
by married couples. Rather, it is the shield of privacy surrounding the marital relationship which these courts have held thwarts the state's attempt to regulate sexual
intimacies between the spouses.").
425. See Strasser, supra note 23, at 1033-34 ("If the Court is going to remain within
its tradition of recognizing the fundamental rights to marry and to have a family and
of only recognizing sexual rights as something instrumentally connected to those
rights, the Court will have to recognize homosexual marriages before it can recognize
a right to homosexual sodomy.").
426. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
427. The point here of course is not that Bowers was rightly decided but merely that
the Bowers rationale would more readily support same-sex marriage than a right to
commit extramarital sodomy. But see Regan, supra note 353, at 1527 (suggesting that
fewer state interests may be implicated by recognizing a private right to commit sodomy than by recognizing a right to same-sex marriage).
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G. Societal Interests
A number of state interests have been offered to justify a state's
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. For example, some suggest
that homosexuality should not be encouraged or condoned by the
state so that individuals will not be induced to develop same-sex romantic relationships. 4" Even if one brackets the issue that the state
should not recommend certain (adult, consenting) romantic partners
over others, there is an empirical claim to examine. Because
decriminalization of sodomy has not led to a decrease in the marriage
rate,42 9 there is no reason to believe that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would induce many people to choose same-sex rather than opposite-sex marriage.430 It is quite unlikely that individuals with a
same-sex orientation would pose a significant threat to the stability or
number of opposite-sex marriages; rather, individuals with an opposite-sex orientation would more likely pose such a threat.43'
Certainly, legalization of same-sex marriages might induce gays and
lesbians not to enter into opposite-sex marriages. This inducement,
428. See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 299 (1992); see also Janet E. Halley,
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 518 (1994) (discussing commentators who hold this
view); Arthur A. Murphy, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance and Containment
II, 97 Dick. L. Rev. 693, 694 (1993) (offering a "containment" strategy so as not to
encourage homosexuality).
429. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("In some countries
(e.g., England, France, Holland, Finland), homosexual conduct has been decriminalized for years, and there is no greater incidence of homosexuality in those countries
than in the United States. Moreover, there have been no adverse side effects in the 21
states that have now decriminalized consensual sodomy between adults in private."),
rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Posner, supra
note 428, at 297 ("No one as far as I know has suggested, let alone presented evidence, that the removal of legal disabilities to homosexuality in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, and the growth of social tolerance to which that removal
must in large part have been due, caused the number of homosexuals to increase.");
Richards, supra note 271, at 993 ("The many countries which have legalized homosexual relations show no decline in the incidence of heterosexual marriage.").
430. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) ("[W]e reject
defendants' suggestion that laws prohibiting discrimination against gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals will undermine marriages and heterosexual families because married
heterosexuals will 'choose' to 'become homosexual' if discrimination against homosexuals is prohibited. This assertion flies in the face of the empirical evidence
presented at trial on marriage and divorce rates."), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 (N.Y. 1980) ("Certainly there is no...
empirical data submitted which demonstrates that marriage is nothing more than a
refuge for persons deprived by legislative fiat of the option of consensual sodomy
outside the marital bond."), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Blackburn, supra note
340, at 149 (taking issue with the claim that "homosexuality might become an accepted lifestyle if the legal proscriptions against it were removed").
431. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 442 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("[T]estimony from both the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' witnesses established that heterosexual males are far more responsible than gays
in this society for the break down of the family unit."), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239).
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however, would presumably benefit all concerned, because it is unlikely that marriages between gay and straight individuals would be
happy or stable. 32
Closely related to the fear that recognition of same-sex marriage
might induce people to choose same-sex rather than opposite-sex relationships is the claim that the state should not condone or endorse the
'
"homosexual lifestyle."433
Most Americans do not approve of gay
4
marriage.
Yet, the state should not endorse certain but not other
marital unions between consenting, autonomous adults. For example,
the state should not endorse intraracial or intrareligious marriages but
not interreligious or interracial marriages. Further, the state's recogmarriages does not entail an ennition of intrasexual or interracial
435
dorsement of those marriages.
When commentators claim that the state should not be endorsing
same-sex relationships, they may implicitly be claiming that the state
should not promote "immorality." Yet, same-sex relationships are not
immoral,4 36 just as interracial relationships are not immoral, majority

view notwithstanding.

437

Neither type of relationship harms anyone.

Although the state has often claimed that punishing same-sex behavior somehow promotes the public welfare, the basis for that position has not been articulated. 4 s There is no reason to believe that the
failure to punish same-sex relationships will somehow lead to a
greater incidence of murder or theft. 439 Indeed, alleged moral rules
432. Fajer, supra note 179, at 594-95; Strasser, supra note 23, at 996-97.
433. Murphy, supra note 428, at 697-99; see also Dean v. District of Columbia, Civ.
A. No. 90-13892,1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992) ("[L]egislative
authorization of homosexual, same-sex marriages would constitute tacit state approval or endorsement of the sexual conduct."), aff'd, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
434. Trosino, supra note 23, at 93 ("The majority of Americans, however, disapprove of gay marriage."); Scott K. Kozuma, Baehr v. Lewin and Same-Sex Marriage:
The Continued Struggle for Socia Politicaland Human Legitimacy, 30 Willamette L.
Rev. 891, 911 (1994) ("Currently, most Americans oppose the legal sanctioning of
same-sex marriages.").
435. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995); Epstein, supra note 177, at 2470.
436. See Strasser, supra note 127, at 966-67 ("[A]ccording to a variety of theories,
homosexual behavior is morally permissible.").
437. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980). The Bonadio
court heldMany issues that are considered to be matters of morals are subject to debate, and no sufficient state interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a particular belief is followed by a number of people, or even a
majority. Indeed, what is considered to be 'moral' changes with the times
and is dependent upon societal background.
Id.
438. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d
289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E2d
936, 940-41 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1991).
439. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Apparently, Representative Dornan wants to blame all of society's evils on bisexuals,
lesbians, and gays. See 140 Cong. Rec. H2026 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of
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designed to penalize unpopular groups who themselves do no harm
must be recognized for what they are-biases masquerading as moral
or legal rules." 0
Even if same-sex behavior and relationships were immoral, this
would not imply that the promotion of morality is of sufficient importance to deny something so fundamental as the right to marry. The
Supreme Court rejected the argument that morality would justify
prohibiting the use of contraception by unmarrieds 44 1 or access to
abortion."' Just as the courts and the state cannot claim in good faith
that procreation through the union of the parties is a compelling state
interest when people of the same sex want to marry, but a noncompelling (or nonexistent) state interest when people of the opposite sex
wish to marry, so, too, neither the courts nor the state can in good
faith use morality to define or delimit the fundamental rights of one
group but not of other groups.
Even those courts and commentators using morality as a justification for penalizing gays and lesbians admit that the interest in promoting morality is not substantial." 3 Further, as the Casey plurality
recognized, men and women of good conscience can disagree about
profound moral questions.'" The Court's "obligation is to define the
Rep. Dornan) (suggesting that "our culture is literally melting down ...the whole
world points at us and refers to our child pornography, our drive-by shootings, our
gangs and carjackings .... people are pulled out of cars by teenagers and beaten

sometimes to death" and that "one of the root causes [is] trying to sell sodomy as a
healthy lifestyle").
440. Koppelman, supra note 179, at 283-84 ("The issue is not 'whether or not to
legislate morality,' but rather what kind of morality may be legislated. Certain moralities are tied to impermissible objectives; the Constitution forbids laws the purpose of
which is to promote these moralities."); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("A state can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.").
441. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 450 (1972).
442. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973) (noting that criminal abortion laws
were "product[s] of a Victorian social concern").
443. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (suggesting that moral concerns are not "particularly 'important' or
'substantial,' or amount[ ] to anything more than a rational basis for regulation." (emphasis omitted)); David S.Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A
Proposal to Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage,49 Tenn. L. Rev. 537,
557 (1982) ("[L]aws that advance a particular view of morality bear a weaker relationship to the public welfare than do laws to ensure the public's security and safety."
(footnote omitted)); J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, ConstitutionalProtection for PersonalLifestyles, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 563, 617 (1977) ("Least persuasive
of the state's justifications for restricting lifestyle freedoms is the general promotion
of morality.").
444. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (plurality opinion)
("Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always
shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage."); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 212
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Reasonable people may differ about whether particular
sexual acts are moral or immoral.").
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liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code.""' Indeed, part of
the public morality of our society is to allow individuals to develop
their private morality according to their own lights, as long as they do
not harm others in the process." 6 Thus, "a mere feeling of distaste or
even revulsion at what someone else is or does, simply because it offends majority values without causing concrete harm""' would not
justify that state's "withholding the marriage statute from same-sex
couples.' '"4 The Supreme Court has recognized that "mere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of... constitutional freedoms"' " 9 and it seems clear that public animosity is one
of the major reasons that gays and lesbians are penalized by society.4 °0
Public animosity against bisexual, lesbian, and gay people does not
implicate a legitimate interest of the state, much less the kind of compelling interest that is required for such a burden on a fundamental
right to be justified." 1 Indeed, there is a strong state interest in eradicating this kind of animosity and prejudice against gay, bisexual, and
lesbian people.4
There are other state interests in promoting marriage, such as record keeping45 3 and stability for children and adults, 454 that support
445. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (plurality opinion). In another context, the Court has
discussed the influence of personal moral beliefs on controversial issues:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even
among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to
the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116.
446. Blackburn, supra note 340, at 149 ("The right of each individual to be free in
his or her private life is no less a manifestation of the moral order of society than is
the protection of public decency.").
447. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A2d 307, 355 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
448. Id
449. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
450. Ted Hansen, Note, Domestic Relations, 22 Drake L Rev. 206, 211 (1972)
("Probably the strongest reasons for prohibiting 'same-sex' marriage are laws against
homosexuality and society's disapproval of homosexual relationships.").
451. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 32 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring) ("lit is
not conceded that a state may legislate to the detriment of a class-a minority who
are unable to protect themselves, when such legislation has no valid purpose behind
it. Nor may the police power be used as a guise to cloak prejudice and intolerance.
Prejudice and intolerance are the cancers of civilization.").
452. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
453. See Caudill, supra note 443, at 558.
454. See Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancingthe Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 486
(1983); Bowman & Cornish, supra note 35, at 1180-81.
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recognition of same-sex marriages.455 Health concerns, e.g., prevention of AIDS,456 support the recognition of same-sex marriage
as a
4 57
way of supporting long-term, monogamous relationships.
Perhaps it will be thought that not enough individuals would be interested in marrying to justify recognizing same-sex unions. Yet, there
is reason to doubt that the number would be insignificant. 458 Even if
the number was likely to be small, however, it would not justify a state
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. The right at issue is "a personal one. ' 459 It is "as an individual 4 60 that a person seeking to
marry his or her same-sex partner would be "entitled to the equal
protection of the laws."' 46 1 The very "essence of the constitutional
right is that it is a personal one. '4 62 The Court has made quite clear
that it "is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the
laws.' 46 3 Thus, because a personal, fundamental right is at issue, the
number of those wishing to avail themselves of this right is beside the
point.464
H. Domestic Relationships
Some of the interests served by marriage would also be served by
recognizing domestic partnerships. For example, economic benefits
might be assured through a different mechanism than marriage.465 Indeed, the state may have a strong interest in setting up a domestic
partnership system, even bracketing same-sex marriage issues.
455. See Zimmer, supra note 82, at 694-95.
456. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
457. Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS and the Non-TraditionalFamily: The Argument for State and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-Sex
Marriages, 16 Nova L. Rev. 809, 810 (1992) ("[T]here are sound public policy reasons

not only to allow same-sex marriages, but also to encourage them. After all, we are
now faced with the deadly and incurable HIV-AIDS disease."); Link, supra note 211,

at 1143-44 ("[G]iven the realities of AIDS, public policy would seem to demand that
gay men, particularly, be encouraged to form stable relationships. A policy which
does not allow them to do so would not seem to meet any standard of rationality at

all.").
458. Sue Nussbaum Averill, Comment, Desperately Seeking Status: Same-Sex

Couples Battle for Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 Akron L. Rev. 253, 278 (1993)
("In 1988, U.S. census officials estimated that there were 1.6 million unmarried samesex couples living in the United States."); see also Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold- Equal MarriageRights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 567, 583 (1994) (discussing two studies

indicating that a large percentage of gays and lesbians would marry if they were able
to marry someone of the same sex).
459. Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 235oU.S. 151, 161 (1914).
463. Id. at 161-62.
464. Apparently Judge Posner does not realize that numbers should not be used in
this way. See Posner, supra note 428, at 293-95.
465. David G. Richardson, Family Rights for Unmarried Couples, 2 Kan. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1993, at 117, 122.
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A significant number of individuals in the United States do not live
in households that fit the traditional definition of family.'8 This poses
certain difficulties for the state. If two individuals have cohabited for
a number of years and that relationship ends, decisions must be made
about how to divide the couple's property. a 7 If the state does nothing, then the shrewd individual who has put all of the property in his
own name will be rewarded." 8
In Marvin v. Marvin,"9 the Supreme Court of California held that

agreements between nonmarried cohabiting individuals relating to
"their earnings, property, or expenses"4 70 may be upheld as long as
they do not "rest upon a consideration of meretricious sexual services." 471 The court rejected the notion that nonmarital relationships
were equivalent to practices involving prostitution. 4 7 The court took
judicial cognizance of the fact that society's mores had changed, concluding that "the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modem
society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when
our courts should by no means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness
'4
of the so-called meretricious relationship to the instant case." 7
Domestic partnership laws that extend certain rights to unmarried
couples are themselves controversial. Critics believe that individuals
should not be given the rights and benefits of marriage without the
466. Stamps, supra note 373, at 441-42 ("A 1988 survey revealed that only twentyseven percent (27%), or 24.6 million, of this country's 91.1 million households fit the
traditional definition of family.").
467. Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing the difficulties "attendant upon establishing property and financial rights between unmarried
couples under available theories of law other than contract").
468. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) ("The rule often
operates to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd, who wind up with
possession of the property, or title to it in their names, at the end of a so-called meretricious relationship." (quoting West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689, 692-93 (1957) (Finley,
J., concurring)), rev'd, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1. 1979).
469. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
470. 1d at 113.
471. Ld.;
see also IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the regulation of escort services does not implicate the fundamental right of
association).
472. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
473. Id.; see also Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (Ct.
App. 1976) (rejecting a policy that "automatically presumes immorality, irresponsibility and the demoralization of tenant relations from the fact of unmarried cohabitation"); Zimmerman v. Burton, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (Civ. Ct. 1980) ("The law must
keep abreast of changing moral standards. Accordingly, recent case precedent reflects a recognition of the rights of unmarried partners."); Hudson View Properties v.
Weiss, 431 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (Civ. Ct. 1980) ("A prohibition against discrimination
based on marital status is consistent with both evolving notions of morality and the
realities of contemporary urban society, where couples openly live in heterosexual
and homosexual units without sanction of state or clergy."), rev'd, 442 N.Y.S.2d 367
(Sup. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 448 N.Y.S.2d 649 (App. Div. 1982), rev'd,450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y.
1983).
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corresponding responsibilities,47 4 presumably believing that the legal

recognition of domestic partnerships would induce people not to
marry. Yet, domestic partnerships are not the equivalent of marriage 475 and do not give individuals all of the rights they would have if
they were married. Further, there is evidence that unmarried cohabi-

tation does not pose a threat to marriage. 476 Finally, there is an additional worry. If the state refuses to extend benefits to cohabiting
couples, then an individual may be induced not to marry so that he

will not have to support the other individual should the relationship
end prematurely. 477 The state has an interest in making sure that individuals are protected if their relationships suddenly end, if only so that
the state will not have to support those individuals.

As far as same-sex unions are concerned, it simply is not fair to
deny individuals the possible benefits of domestic partnerships be-

cause, allegedly, they could have married when in fact same-sex partners cannot marry.47 8 Indeed, there is some question whether the
state can in good faith condition benefits on marriage when same-sex
couples cannot marry and when same-sex relationships serve the same

functions as the traditional

family. 479

Notwithstanding the appearance of bad faith, courts that uphold a
denial of benefits to same-sex partners sometimes invoke the societal
474. Richardson, supra note 465, at 118 ("Opponents of extending family rights to
unmarried heterosexual couples argue that a couple should not be given the legal
rights and benefits attached to marriage without also accepting the correlative marital
legal responsibilities.").
475. Link, supra note 211, at 1148 ("Domestic partnership is not a proposal for
spousal equivalency.... Because domestic partnership is not a marriage, it does not
automatically entitle the partners to established statutory benefits.") For example,
domestic partnership laws in other countries may not allow the gay or lesbian couple
to adopt. See Stamps, supra note 373, at 456 (discussing the Danish Domestic Partnership Act, which does not allow gay or lesbian couples to adopt); see also Wolfson,
supra note 458, at 606 (stating that "domestic partnership is indeed second-class").
476. Caudill, supra note 443, at 547 ("Many sociologists do not consider unmarried
cohabitation, as an alternative or a preliminary to marriage, a threat to the institution
of marriage." (footnote omitted)).
477. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (suggesting that
a rule denying cohabitants benefits "can only encourage a partner with obvious income-producing ability to avoid marriage and to retain all earnings which he may
acquire."), rev'd, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (IM. 1979).
478. Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 596 (Ct. App. 1992) ("To the
extent plaintiffs were treated differently than a 'married couple,' it is because they are
not married and not because they are homosexuals."); Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting that "[h]omosexuals
are simply a part of the larger class of unmarried persons"); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *11 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 3, 1994) ("All
persons, whatever their sexual orientation, who are not married, are not eligible for
benefits for a partner."), aff'd, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Phillips v.
Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n 482 N.W.2d 121, 129 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
appellant "is thus in the same position as all unmarried heterosexual males and
females").
479. See Karst, supra note 87, at 684.
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policy of favoring marriage,1 0 as if these individuals had tried to secure legal benefits while avoiding the accompanying legal detriments.
For example, a Wisconsin court noted that "[t]he law imposes no mutual duty of general support, and no responsibility for provision of
medical care, on unmarried couples of any gender, as it does on married persons."'" Such a rationale is unpersuasive given that same-sex
individuals cannot marry, and given that those who incur the legal obligations contractually are still denied the relevant benefits.4s2
A separate issue involves the difficulties courts may have in determining whether individuals are domestic partners or mere friends.
Yet, systems can be set up relatively easilyO to ensure that courts will
not have to closely examine the intimate details of individuals' lives to
see whether they indeed constitute a family, 4 4 discriminating against
those couples unwilling to have their privacy invaded in that way.4as
The unseemliness of invading couples' privacy can thus be avoided. 4s6
Further, courts will not have to worry about whether they are using an
artificially high standard to determine who qualifies as domestic partners. With an appropriate administrative system, the benefits of
domestic partnerships could be attained without the accompanying
costs.
Of course, not all unmarried couples wish to be classified as domestic partners.8 Some wish neither to have the responsibilities nor the
benefits of marriage, and it seems sensible to allow individuals to have
this option.489 Presumably, one of the reasons that some courts insist
480. Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596 (discussing "the state's legitimate interest in promoting marriage.... [which] is furthered by conferring statutory rights upon married
persons which are not afforded unmarried partners"); see also Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 417 ("The state's public policy favoring marriage is promoted by conferring statutory rights upon married persons which are not afforded unmarried partners.").
481. Phillips,482 N.W.2d at 126.
482. See Beaty, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594-95 (upholding denial of an insurance policy
reserved for married couples to a homosexual couple with joint contractual legal obligations); Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (upholding denial of employee dental care
benefits to homosexual couple with joint contractual legal obligations).
483. See generally Bowman & Cornish, supra note 35 (describing the characteristics
of domestic partner relationships).
484. See Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
485. Id
486. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the FtnctionalApproach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L Rev. 1640, 1653 (1991) [hereinafter Note, Family Resemblance]; see also James D. Esseks, Recent Development,
Redefining the Family,25 Harv. C.RI-CL. L. Rev. 183,195 (1990) (stating that examining couples' personal lives is intrusive).
487. See Note, Family Resemblance, supra note 486, at 1654; see also Esseks, supra
note 486, at 195 ("Family life for many traditional families is not the rosy picture of
long-term, exclusive devotion and emotional commitment on which the court relies as
its standard.").
488. See Freman, supra note 361, at 325.
489. Id. ("Many couples knowingly choose cohabitation over marriage to avoid the
formal economic consequence of marriage.").
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upon explicit agreements490 between unmarried cohabitants is precisely because they realize that some cohabitants do not want their
relationships to be marriage-like. This factor must be weighed against
considerations that militate against requiring such agreements, e.g.,
that as a matter of fact these agreements tend not to be made 4 9 and
that the state may be forced to provide for one of the partners should
the relationship break up. The point here is not that states should (or
should not) require explicit oral or written agreements between cohabitants before they will have some marital benefits, but that this
issue should not be allowed to be used as a smokescreen to deny
same-sex couples who are willing to make the appropriate explicit
agreements the benefits that opposite-sex couples may enjoy.
Just as some commentators worry that granting unmarried cohabitants some of the rights and responsibilities of married individuals
may make it very difficult for others who wish to live together but not
to be accorded those rights and responsibilities, other commentators
worry that if the state recognizes the right of same-sex individuals to
marry, some same-sex individuals wishing to cohabit but not to have
the rights and responsibilities of marriage may find it increasingly dif493
ficult to do so4" or may come to be treated as second class citizens.
Yet, the argument that opposite-sex couples should not be allowed to
marry so that individuals who do not want to marry will not be saddled with unwanted rights and responsibilities would be treated with
disdain. Presumably, were same-sex couples allowed to marry, some
would avail themselves of that option and some would not. Of those
that chose not to marry, some would want the rights and responsibilities that opposite-sex cohabitants have acquired,4 9 4 while others
would not want such rights and responsibilities. All of these different
types of individuals can be accommodated. The central issue is
whether same-sex couples are afforded the same options as oppositesex couples.495
490. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) ("[W]e de-

cline to recognize an action based upon an implied contract for personal services between unmarried persons living together.").
491. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspec-

tive, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125, 1164 (1981) ("[U]nmarried cohabiting couples simply do
not make formal cohabitation contracts."); cf. Alexander v. Alexander, 445 So. 2d
836, 842 (Miss. 1984) (Lee, J., dissenting) (finding that no express agreement had
existed, precisely because the individuals had considered themselves man and wife
and thus had not needed to make the agreement explicit).
492. Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 Law &
Sexuality 31, 50-51 (1991).

493. See Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage,29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505,
528 (1994); Dunlap, supra note 327, at 78.

494. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding express agreement between same-sex cohabitants).
495. Zimmer, supra note 82, at 694-95 ("The real issue is equal choice. Same-sex
couples need options equivalent to those available to their heterosexual
counterparts.").
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CONCLUSION

When courts have upheld state refusals to recognize same-sex marriages, they have employed a variety of specious rationales to do so.
They have used definitional preclusion arguments that would never be
accepted in other contexts, refused to acknowledge the obvious equal
protection issues, and inappropriately delimited the fundamental right
to marry. Further, courts have exaggerated the importance of certain
state interests while ignoring others and then refused to acknowledge
that the recognized interests would be promoted rather than undermined by same-sex marriages.
Both domestic partnerships for same-sex couples 496 and same-sex
marriages497 have been permitted in other societies, and thus the recognition of such unions is not as novel as might be believed. Further,
the fact that states have not recognized these unions thus far is no
reason for courts to allow this practice to continue. Intrasexual marriage prohibitions, like interracial marriage prohibitions, are invidious
and must be struck down as violating the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
One of the most underappreciated facets of the same-sex marriage
controversy is the extent to which domestic relations jurisprudence
must change in order to justify the prohibition. Many of the arguments now offered to justify the same-sex marriage ban, such as the
definitional preclusion argument, could also be used to justify prohibitions of interracial or interreligious marriage. The Equal Protection
Clause has to be given such a cramped interpretation to justify this
prohibition that, if so viewed in other contexts, it would offer no protection to a variety of types of individuals currently given protection.
So too, the understanding of substantive due process that is required
to justify this application would seem to put many "fundamental"
rights at risk. The state's interests in "morality" or procreation could
496. Nussbaum, supra note 272, at 1524; Richardson, supra note 465, at 121;
Stamps, supra note 373, at 456.
497. As one commentator has noted:
Same-sex marriages continued and were well-known in the Roman Empire
until the mid-fourth century. While the precise definition of marriage has
varied from one community to another and from one era to the next, there is
a tradition of Christian same-sex marriage ceremonies celebrating unions
that were considered marriages in the same sense in which opposite-sex
couples married. The tradition of same-sex marriage transcends thousands
of years of human history.

Damslet, supra note 415, at 560 (footnotes omitted); see Keller, supra note 262, at 513
("[T]hrough the late middle ages homosexuality was well tolerated and encouraged,
and gay marriages were sanctioned by the Catholic Church."); Link, supra note 211,
at 1085-86 ("[lIt now appears that the original Christian ceremony for uniting couples
united same-sex couples."); Scott Turner, Comment, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.: In
Praiseof Family, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 1295, 1322 (1991) ("[G]ay marriages were an
established part of Western Christendom after the fifth century."); see generally Eskridge, supra note 199 (discussing same-sex unions in various cultures throughout
history).

986
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be used to justify a variety of surprising policies if they can be so used
here.
That the courts seem willing to invoke allegedly compelling interests to penalize one group but to ignore those interests when other,
relevantly similar groups are involved is itself cause for concern. The
rule of law and the integrity of the courts themselves are thereby
brought into question. If courts continue to uphold intrasexual marriage bans and continue to offer the kinds of analyses thus far offered
to justify such policies, the implications for domestic relations jurisprudence specifically, and our legal system generally, are frightening
to contemplate.

